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In a recently published article, ChiefJudge James S. Burns (retired) contends
that the Hawaiian Crown Lands were owned by all the people ofHawai'i and
were not held in trust for Native Hawaiians as Professor Jon Van Dyke
argued in his book, Who Owns the Crown Lands. Although this author, as
with many others, takes issue with the research and conclusions of that
article, this Article focuses upon the larger issue of the reliance on the
Supreme Court of the United States'jaded recitation of Hawai'i's complex
political and legal history. The article specifically relies upon two Supreme
Court opinions, Rice v. Cayetano and Hawai'i v. Office of Hawaiian
Affairs-two politically charged cases that dealt large blows to the Native
Hawaiian community particularly because of the Court's skewed views of
Hawai'i's past. Native Hawaiians, like most indigenous people, are faced
with a legal system that rarely recognizes their stories and their histories.
Due in large part to the enshrined principle of stare decisis, Native
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Hawaiians have been left with a less than adequate narrative of their legal
and political history that has ramifications for other indigenous and
marginalized communities across the United States. The Court's narrative is
oftentimes then interpreted, particularly by jurists and legal practitioners, as
the "official" history of a people. This Article criticizes the Court's writing of
Hawaiian history in its opinions and also the re-writing of history and
silencing of Native voices that occurs when jurists and practitioners blindly
adhere to "precedent." This Article demands careful use of history when
analyzing complex issues involving Native Hawaiians, and provides methods
for ensuring an accurate recitation of history.
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2015, a student attending a conference in Washington, D.C.,
asked Associate Justice Antonin Scalia whether the United States Congress
could annex an independent nation by way of a joint resolution. Justice
Scalia-perhaps one of the brightest conservative legal thinkers of his
time-responded that there was nothing in the Constitution that precluded
such action and that it would likely be upheld because the annexation "went
through a process." 2 Scalia apparently proceeded to provide "examples" of
this type of "process" through the American acquisition of the Philippines
and Puerto Rico following the Spanish-American War.3 When prodded
about the "process" for annexing Hawai'i in 1898, the conservative
firebrand implied that Hawai'i was also a spoil of the Spanish-American
War and stated that, based on international law, there has been "hundreds of
years worth of problems there."4
Justice Scalia's response elucidated sharp criticism from Professor
Williamson B.C. Chang, a scholar in Hawai'i's legal history and an expert
in Hawaiian law. Professor Chang argued that Scalia was "clearly wrong"6
and, along with the rest of the American public, was "deeply ignorant" of
the annexation of Hawai'i.7 Professor Chang crafted an argument premised
1 Jacob Bryan Aki, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, Hawaii and Annexation,
HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.civilbeat.org/2015/02/supreme-court-
justice-antonin-scalia-hawaii-and-annexation.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See Williamson Chang, Darkness Over Hawaii: The Annexation Myth is the Greatest
Obstacle to Progress, 16 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 70 (2015). This author takes no position
on Professor Chang's theory that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to annex
Hawai'i.
6 See id. at 77.
7 Id. at 71.
632
2017 / (RE)RIGHTING HISTORY
on a review of the legislative debates surrounding the U.S. Senate's failed
efforts to ratify a treaty of annexation-the Constitutional means by which
annexation is accomplished.
Justice Scalia's remarks, while simply a cursory attempt at appeasing a
college student's question, and Professor Chang's scathing response, evince
the complexities of Hawaiian legal and political history. This tiff also
highlights a recurring problem encountered by Native Hawaiians and other
marginalized communities whose concerns are addressed before courts of
law: the courts' often skewed use of history in their legal opinions. Indeed,
while a Supreme Court justice can state things during a meeting with
students that have no legally binding effect, he or she has the power to set
harmful precedent that is often times difficult for practitioners to overcome.
As analyzed below, the Supreme Court of the United States has
selectively used aspects of Hawaiian history as a means to justify its
political ends. As Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote, "Judges often are not
thorough or objective historians." 9 This selective use of laws and facts to
recreate or reimagine the past is dangerous and is a highly political practice
with severe consequences for those communities with little access to courts
to vindicate their own history. In Part II of this Article, the Court's use of
history and the evolution of the use of history in judicial opinions is briefly
reviewed to show the trend of both liberal and conservative justices toward
writing historical essays to justify their decisions. Part III of this Article,
titled "Righting History," then critiques the conservative narrative of
Hawai'i's past through the lens of two cases: Rice v. Cayetanolo and
Hawai'i v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs." These two cases reveal a Court
that is willing to ignore, erase, and revise history to ensure the integrity of
its decisions. Finally, Part IV of this Article discusses the consequences of
See generally id. Professor Chang argued specifically that because there was no
mutual treaty of annexation, the United States did not receive an "objective metes and
bounds description of the islands and waters" that therefore caused a "break in the chain of
sovereignty." Id. at 90. The Admission Act describes the lands of the newly formed State of
Hawai'i as those lands "included in the Territory of Hawaii on the date of the enactment of
this Act[.]" Admission Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 2, 73 Stat. 4, 4. The "Territory of
Hawaii" was defined in the Organic Act as "the islands acquired by the United States of
America under an Act of Congress entitled 'Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the
Hawaiian Islands to the United States[.]' Act of Apr. 30, 1900, Pub. L. No. 56-331, § 2, 31
Stat. 141, 141 [hereinafter Organic Act]. Therefore, according to Professor Chang, "by the
combined effect of the two acts there are no lands and waters in the State of Hawaii!"
Chang, supra note 5, at 97.
9 Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution,
45 COLUM L. REv. 1, 6 (1945).
10 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
" 556 U.S. 163 (2009).
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relying upon the Court's biased and flawed narrative and proposes steps for
addressing some of these problems for practitioners and judges. This
Article concludes that practitioners and, particularly judges, should be
cautious when relying upon the Court's recitation of the history of Hawai'i
as authoritative.
II. HISTORY'S COMPLEXITIES: THE JUDICIAL INCLUSION OF
HISTORICAL ESSAYS
A. The Supreme Court's Use of History
History and law are closely intertwined.1 2  Indeed, history is a
methodological tool that is imbedded in the principle of stare decisis; courts
use history as a way to document how legal issues were decided in order to
predict the outcome of future cases.1 3 The entire premise of litigation itself
is to determine what occurred in the past, who was at fault for such conduct,
and whose story is more convincing. History is also used to define
legislative intent. When the text of a statute is ambiguous, courts will resort
to an analysis of legislative materials such as drafts of the legislation,
committee reports, speeches from legislators, and testimony received during
the committee hearings. These resources provide a toolkit for a court to
ascertain what legislators were intending in passing the law. History, thus,
serves as a way for a court to legitimize its decision. However, in Clio and
the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, Professor Alfred H. Kelly provided a
theoretical survey of the Supreme Court's misuse of history. 14 Kelly
specifically identified two alternative ways in which the court uses history
to justify its decision: judicial fiat and the "law-office history."
First, in what he termed "judicial fiat" or "authoritative revelation," Kelly
stated that in order to determine the intent of a constitutional provision, the
Court would issue "a simple declarative statement of a revelatory kind of
what the original intent actually had been."" Once written, future courts
could, under the doctrine of stare decisis, then rely upon that retelling of
history: "by quoting history, the Court made history, since what it declared
to be was frequently more important than what the history might actually
12 See Daniel A. Farber, Adjudication of Things Past: Reflections on History as
Evidence, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1030 (1998) ("The linkage between past and present is
especially central in law.").
13 Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 119,
121 (1965).
14 Id. at 122.
15 Id. at 122-23.
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have been."1 6  This practice of "judicial fiat" was perhaps best
accomplished in the early years of the nation with Chief Justice John
Marshall, who mastered "simple declarative statement[s]" to enshrine
legislative intent into the meaning of the laws.' 7 For example, in Marbury
v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall reviewed three clauses of the
Constitution to reach the following revelatory statement: "From these, and
many other selections which might be made, it is apparent, that the Framers
of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the
government of courts, as well as of the legislature."" Kelly discussed the
use of judicial fiat in landmark cases, like Plessy v. Ferguson, where the
Court, without examining the evidence, stated that the "Fourteenth
Amendment in the nature of things could not have been intended to abolish
distinction based upon color."19
Kelly then identified a second historical technique, the historical essay,
which judges use to support their opinions. This technique, according to
Kelly is employed "as an instrument of extreme political activism,
involving extensive judicial intervention in contemporary political
problems."20 History, in these circumstances, was used as a "precedent-
breaking device" so that the Court could "return to the aboriginal meaning
of the Constitution." 2 1 Under this historical essay approach, the Court's
opinion was "partisan[,]" "used evidence wrenched from its contemporary
16 Id. at 123.
1 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 190 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 403 (1819); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 206 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. 87, 138 (1810).
I8 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 127, 179-80 (1803) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5;
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1).
19 Kelly, supra note 13, at 125 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896)). In
Plessy, the Court upheld racial segregation and the doctrine of separate but equal, which led
to the horrors of the Jim Crow South. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
393 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). Writing separately from the Bakke
majority, Justice Marshall explained:
In the wake of Plessy, many States expanded their Jim Crow laws, which had up until
that time been limited primarily to passenger trains and schools. The segregation of
the races was extended to residential areas, parks, hospitals, theaters, waiting rooms,
and bathrooms. There were even statutes and ordinances which authorized separate
phone booths for Negroes and whites, which required that textbooks used by children
of one race be kept separate from those used by the other, and which required that
Negro and white prostitutes be kept in separate districts.
Id. at 835-36. In recent times, the Court has resorted to judicial fiat when it reinterpreted the
pleading standards to require a recitation of detailed facts. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
20 Kelly, supra note 13, at 125.
21 id.
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historical context[,]" and used "carefully selected ... materials designed to
prove the thesis at hand, suppressing all data that might impeach the desired
historical conclusions."2 2 Kelly cited Scott v. Sandford, as an example of
the use of the historical essay.23 There, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney wrote
a historical essay that described the role of "Negros" in early America to
justify his assertion that the Constitution was a "white man's document." 24
In this case, the justices "wrote history for political reasons, that is, in an
attempt to solve by judicial intervention some major contemporary socio-
political problem upon which the case at hand cold be made to bear." 25
B. Rise of the Historical Essay
Many have analyzed the evolution of the use of the historical essay in the
twentieth century.26 In the early 1900s, the use of the historical essay
declined primarily because the justices did not need it:
The Court was dominated by an activist philosophy in these years, as it
adjusted the constitutional system to the exigencies of the industrial
revolution and the new capitalism, but it has two other major instruments at
hand that all but eliminated the need to resort to history for this purpose:
22 Id. at 126.
23 Id. at 125 (citing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)).
24 In Scott, the Court noted:
It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were citizens of the several States
when the Constitution was adopted. And in order to do this, we must recur to the
Governments and institutions of the thirteen colonies, when they separated from Great
Britain and formed new sovereignties, and took their places in the family of
independent nations. We must inquire who, at that time, were recognized as the
people or citizens of a State, whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the
English Government; and who declared their independence, and assumed the powers
of Government to defend their rights by force of arms. In the opinion of the court, the
legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of
Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had been imported as
slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then
acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words
used in that memorable instrument.
60 U.S. at 407.
25 Kelly, supra note 13, at 126.
26 See, e.g., William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court
and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REv. 227 (1988); Francis Stites, Comment on "Clio
as Hostage", 24 CAL. W.L. REv. 273 (1988); Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A
Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses ofHistory, 13 J.L. & POLS. 809 (1997); Matthew
J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 479
(2008).
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substantive due process and a "sovereign prerogative of choice" in state-
federal relations.27
Substantive due process provided the Court with "immense activist
flexibility" in their decision-making. 28 However, when both substantive
due process and "sovereign prerogative of choice" waned, the Court
reinvigorated its use of the historical essay.29
From the late 1940s to the 1960s, the use of the historical essay
increased. Kelly examined several opinions from the Warren Court that
incorporated the use of the historical essay and concluded that the "'liberal
history' of the present Court is not much better than the business-minded
vested rights 'history'. . . . [and] fails to stand up under the most superficial
scrutiny by a scholar possessing some knowledge of American
constitutional development." 30 For example, Kelly argued that the Court
committed a "historical felony" when it "mangled constitutional history" to
mandate the "one person, one vote" doctrine in Wesberry v. Sanders.3 In
Wesberry, Justice Hugo Black specifically concluded for a majority that
"construed in its historical context, the command of Article 1, Sec[tion] 2,
that Representatives be chosen 'by People of the several States' means that
as nearly as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be
worth as much as another's." 32  To reach his conclusion, Justice Black
relied upon statements from the debates of the Constitutional Convention.3 3
Those statements, however, had "nothing at all to do with the question of
representation within the states."34 Instead, the statements related to the
debate between those in favor of state equality in the legislature and those
in favor of proportional representation within the states.35  Justice Black
nevertheless included the statements in his recitation of history in his
historical essays to rationalize social change.3 6
27 Kelly, supra note 13, at 128.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 130-32.
30 Id. at 132.
31 Id. at 135 (citing Wesberryv. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)).
32 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8.
33 Id. at 10-13.
34 Kelly, supra note 13, at 135.
35 Id.; see also Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 30-42 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36 Some have argued that the Court is constrained to bring about social change. See
generally THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003)
(noting that the judiciary was envisioned as a branch wholly dependent upon the executive
and legislative branches inasmuch as the judiciary: "has no influence over either the sword
or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take
no active resolution whatever[,]" but "may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL,
but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for
the efficacy of its judgments"); see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
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With the election of Ronald Reagan as President came a conservative
push for a "jurisprudence of original intent." 3 7 Reagan's Attorney General,
Edwin Meese, promised that the Justice Department would "endeavor to
resurrect the original meaning of constitutional provisions [based upon the]
belief that only 'the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and
ratified by the nation' . . . provide[s] a solid foundation for adjudication." 38
Under the theory of originalism, judges would ascertain the "intent" of the
Founders by conducting a historical review of that particular measure,
which would "supposedly result in interpretations of the Constitution that
showed proper deference to the political branches of government, and
would limit the degree to which judges decided cases based on their
'ideological predilections' or subjective policy preferences." 3 9  History
would, therefore, be used as a sword to justify a judge's decision. 4 0
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 10 (2008) (arguing that a court is unable to produce
significant social reform because of "the limited nature of constitutional rights, the lack of
judicial independence, and the judiciary's inability to develop appropriate policies and its
lack of powers of implementation"). For example, in the context of public school
desegregation, Rosenberg asserted, "Congressional and executive branch action ... was
virtually non-existent until the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." Id. at 46. Similarly,
some argued that meaningful desegregation did not occur until Lyndon B. Johnson became
President over a decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and took
affirmative action to secure passage of the Civil Rights Act. See JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR
ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 452 (2006). While there may have been
some instances of executive support of Brown, there were other factors at play that
precluded its wholesale adoption for the purpose of promoting racial equality within schools.
For example, at Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower federally deputized the Arkansas National Guard, who escorted black children
into a white school. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 151 (2000). However, "[f]rom the perspective of President
Eisenhower, the core interests at stake in Little Rock had more to do with federal authority
and foreign affairs than with racial equality." Id. President Eisenhower's actions were
clearly intended to appease the eyes from around the world that were focused in on
American society in a time when America was trying to promote democracy overseas and
contain the spread of communism.
37 Several scholars have written about originalism. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The
Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV.
455 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989);
Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. REV. 611 (1999).
38 Wiecek, supra note 26, at 266 (citing Attorney General Edwin Meese, III, Address to
American Bar Association, July 9, 1985, reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING
OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 9-10 (1986)).
39 Festa, supra note 26, at 489.
40 Many scholars have criticized originalism. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Active
Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2387 (2005); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); James H. Hutson, The Creation of the
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Originalism came to the fore with the failed confirmation of Circuit Judge
Robert Bork for a seat on the Court.41
In response to the originalism movement, judges and scholars began
asserting the notion that the Constitution was a "living" document whose
meaning was not fixed at the time of its enactment, but was rather defined
by the aspirations it signified.42  At around the same time, legal scholars
began putting forth new narratives of historical events. In providing voice
to the voiceless, these scholars began to critically examine the role of race
in American society, and its role in history.43
Accordingly, over the course of the institution's 200-plus-year history,
the justices-both conservative and liberal-have not been coy in using
history to satisfy their own political agendas.4 4 Native Hawaiians, and their
story, were not immune from this gamesmanship.
Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1986). The
conservative backlash to the Warren Court's decisions was not unique to the Brown
decision. In his book, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, William J. Stuntz
discusses how the Warren Court's decisions on criminal procedures had a similar unintended
backlash from conservatives. Warren Court decisions, such as Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), turned the focus of prosecution of alleged criminals from the merits of the alleged
cnme to ensuring that proper procedural mechanisms were in place. According to Stuntz,
the Warren Court "proceduralized criminal litigation, siphoning the time of attorneys and
judges away from the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence and toward the process
by which the defendant was arrested, tried, and convicted" and "chose to ramp up the level
of constitutional regulation of state and local criminal justice at a time when crime was
rising sharply and criminal punishment was falling substantially." WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 228 (2011). This dramatic shift in criminal law,
combined with the conservative rallying cry for "law and order," forced liberals toward a
more punitive stance on criminality.
41 See infra Part III.A; Jack N. Rakove, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE
OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 4-5 (1990) (asserting that "the rejection of Bork's nomination might
in part be seen as a repudiation of the theory of interpretation with which he was
associated").
42 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 5 (1985).
43 See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 4 U. ILL. L. REV.
893, 893-910 (1995); Peggy Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1559-77
(1989); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
(2d ed. 2012).
4 See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 BOSTON L. REV. 699, 700 (2002)
(describing the Court's political ruling in Bush v. Gore).
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III. RIGHTING HISTORY: ANALYZING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
NARRATIVE OF HAWAI'I'S PAST
A unique narrative of Hawai'i's past has developed from the Court's
decisions in two recent cases. These cases epitomize the Court's use of the
historical essay to write out Native Hawaiians and their perspectives from
the history of Hawai'i. As analyzed below, the Court has ignored, erased,
and revised the history of Native Hawaiians and created a uniquely
American narrative of the past.
A. Erasing History
"This is a case of ballot-box discrimination plain and simple.... There is
no question that what Hawai[']i is attempting to do here is discrimination
on the basis of race[,]" decried Theodore Olson.45 John G. Roberts, Jr.
argued, "[The petitioner] was not permitted to vote ... because he is not a
beneficiary of the trust[.]" 46 Justice Anthony Kennedy shot back, "[y]ou
begin by saying, now, this is not [about] race, it's [about] a trust . .. [but]
[o]f course it has to do with Hawaiian ethnicity." 4 7 Attorney Edwin S.
Kneedler argued that Hawaiians are a "distinct people determined to
maintain their culture, their language, and their ties to the land[.]" 48 "There
are a lot of groups in this country like that[,]" quipped Justice Antonin
Scalia.49
On October 6, 1999, inside the ornate courtroom of the United States
Supreme Court, the justices peppered lawyers on the constitutionality of the
Hawai'i state law that mandated that only those of Hawaiian-descent could
vote in the elections for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairsso-an
45 Transcript of Oral Argument, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818),
1999 WL 955376, at *3, *5 [hereinafter Rice Oral Argument].
46 Id at *20.
47 Id at *24.
48 Id at *36.
49id
5o The Office of Hawaiian Affairs' mandates is set forth in the Hawai'i Constitution:
The Board of Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs shall exercise power as
provided by law: to manage and administer the proceeds from the sale or other
disposition of the lands, natural resources, minerals and income derived from whatever
sources for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians, including all income and proceeds from
that pro rata portion of the trust referred to in Section 4 of this article for native
Hawaiians to formulate policy relating to affairs of native Hawaiians and Hawaiians;
and to exercise control over real and personal property set aside by state, federal or
private sources and transferred to the board for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians. The
board shall have the power to exercise control over the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
through its executive officer, the administrator of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, who
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entity created to better the conditions of Native Hawaiians and serve as a
receptacle for reparations between the Hawaiian community and the State
and federal governments." Indeed, following a Hawaiian cultural and
spiritual renaissance, the people of Hawai'i-through a vote following the
State's 1978 Constitutional Convention-approved a constitutional
amendment creating the Office of Hawaiian Affairs.52 The agency would
be funded through revenues from the public lands trust that was established
at Statehood. 3 Pursuant to the State constitutional amendment, Native
Hawaiians would elect other Native Hawaiians to serve as trustees of the
entity.5 4 The goal of the entity, which Hawai'i's people ratified, was truly
reconciliatory: to "unite Hawaiians as a people[,]" to ensure that
"Hawaiians have more impact on their future[,]" and to provide it
"maximum independence."" But, that goal would be put to the test.
shall be appointed by the board.
HAW. CONST. art XII, § 6.
51 Id.; see STATE OF HAWAI'I, 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1978 1018 (1980).
52 See, e.g., ToM COFFMAN, THE ISLAND EDGE OF AMERICA: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
HAWAI'I 289-316 (2003); Davianna McGregor-Alegado, Hawaiians: Organizing in the
1970s, 7 AMERASIA J. 29, 29-55 (1980).
53 The federal government required the State of Hawai'i, upon its admission into the
Union, to hold public lands and its associated revenue in trust for several purposes, including
the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians:
The lands granted to the State of Hawaii . . . shall be held by said State as a public trust
for the support of the public schools and other public education institutions, for the
betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the development of farm and home ownership
on as widespread a basis as possible for the making of public improvements, and for
the provision of lands for the public use. Such lands, proceeds, and income shall be
managed and disposed of for one or more of the foregoing purposes in such manner as
the constitution and laws of said State may provide, and their use for any other object
shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the United States.
Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(f), 73 Stat. 4, 6 (1959). The State subsequently
delegated a portion of the Section 5(f) trust funds from these Public Trust Lands to the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 4 ("The lands granted to the State of
Hawaii by Section 5(b) of the Admission Act and pursuant to Article XVI, Section 7, of the
State Constitution, excluding therefrom lands defined as 'available lands' by Section 203 of
the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, shall be held by the State as a
public trust for native Hawaiians and the general public." (emphasis added)); Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 10-13.5 (1990) ("Twenty per cent of all funds derived from the public land trust,
described in Section 10-3, shall be expended by the [Office of Hawaiian Affairs], as defined
in Section 10-2, for the purposes of this chapter.").
54 HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 5, invalidated in part by Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 522
(2000).
5 STATE OF HAWAI'I, 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1978
1018 (1980); H. Journal, 17th Leg., Reg. Sess., 791 (Haw. 1993) (statement of Rep.
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In March 1996, Harold "Freddy" Rice sought to register to vote for
trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs in the upcoming election.5 6 The
registration form contained a declaration that required the applicant to attest
that: "I am also Hawaiian and desire to register to vote in OHA elections." 7
Rice crossed out the phrase "am also Hawaiian and" and marked "yes" on
the application. As Rice was not of Hawaiian ancestry, his application to
register to vote in the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' election was denied.5 9
Rice, whose great-great grandparents were part of the initial Christian
missionary families that came to Hawai'i and struck it rich, and whose
great-grandfather helped to orchestrate the institution of the Bayonet
Constitution and the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, 60 filed a lawsuit
against then-Governor Ben Cayetano.6 ' In his lawsuit, Rice alleged that the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs election violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution because it premised his right
62to vote on race.
Okamura) ( "[t]he injustice perpetrated on the Hawaiian people a century ago has been a
cancer that insidiously all too silently has been destroying the fabric of our community").
Delegates of the 1978 Constitutional Convention expressly envisioned the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs as a "receptacle for any funds, land or other resources earmarked for or
belonging to native Hawaiians[.]" See STATE OF HAWAI'I, supra, at 644. The Committee
viewed the creation of the office of Hawaiian Affairs "of utmost importance" because it
"provide[d] for accountability, self-determination, [and] methods for self-sufficiency
through assets and a land base[.]" Id. at 646; see also infra Section IIIB; Act Relating to the
Island of Kaho'olawe, §2, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 804-06; Act Relating to Hawaiian
Sovereignty, § 1, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 999.
56 Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1548 (D. Haw. 1997).
57 Id.
58id.
59 id.
60 See JON M. VAN DYKE, WHO OWNS THE CROWN LANDS OF HAWAI'I? 120-24, 151-71
(2008).
61 Paul G. Stader, Rice v. Cayetano: America's Evolving Legal Debate Over Race, and
the Consequences of Applying "Color-Blind" Constitutionalism to Law Affecting
Indigenous Peoples (May 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai'i at
Manoa) (on file with Hamilton Library, University of Hawai'i at Manoa). Rice believed that
by filing the lawsuit he was "helping" Native Hawaiians, whom he saw as "taking advantage
of the welfare system by choosing not to work." Eric K. Yamamoto & Catherine C. Betts,
Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of
Rice v. Cayetano, in RACE LAW STORIES 545 (Moran and Carbado, eds., 2007) (citation
omitted). The same attitude was reflected in Rice's counsel, John W. Goemans, who moved
to Hawai'i prior to statehood in 1959, and who supported the elimination of federal funding
for programs benefitting Native Hawaiians because of his "commitment to the civil rights
laws of this country and to the Constitution." Id.
62 Rice, 963 F. Supp. at 1548-49; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."); U.S. CONST. amend. XV ("The right of citizens of the United
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Both Rice and Governor Cayetano-who had tense relations with
Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs6 3-moved separately for
summary judgment in their respective favors on the claim that the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs' voting scheme violated the federal constitution. 64 The
Governor argued that "Native Hawaiian" was a political classification that
the government could treat as analogous to the status of Indian tribes.65
Rice argued that Article XII, Section 5 of the Hawai'i State Constitution,
which established the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, and Hawai'i Revised
Statutes Section 10-13D, which specified that persons entitled to vote must
be Native Hawaiian, were unconstitutional because Native Hawaiians "are a
racial rather than a political group." 66 Rice expressly rejected the notion
that Native Hawaiians were akin to a recognized Indian tribe and, thus,
should be afforded special status under federal law.67 The distinction of
whether "Hawaiian" was a racial classification or a political classification
was important in establishing which test the court would apply to determine
the constitutionality of the law.68 Naturally, because the Governor argued
that "Hawaiian" was a political classification, he asserted that the law
should be reviewed under the less strenuous rational basis test. 69
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
63 See, e.g., BENJAMIN CAYETANO, BEN: A MEMOIR, FROM STREET KID TO GOVERNOR
443 (2009) (noting the animosity toward some Office of Hawaiian Affairs trustees: "They
don't listen to anyone but themselves, they sing only to the choir and that's not going to
change.").
64 Rice, 963 F. Supp. at 1548-49.
65 Id. at 1549-50.
6 See id. at 1549.
67 Id.
68 Under a Fourteenth Amendment equal protections analysis, on one end of the
spectrum, a racial classification is reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard, which requires
that the government show a "compelling governmental interest" in enacting the law and that
the law enacted was "necessary" to further that interest. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995). On the other end of the spectrum, a political classification
is reviewed under the less stringent "rational basis test," which requires the government to
provide a rational connection between enacting the law and the legislative objective. See
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). It is generally acknowledged that government
action is almost always validated under a rational basis review and almost always
invalidated under the strict scrutiny standard. See Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185
(1976) (citation omitted) (holding that under a rational basis test, laws will be upheld unless
the government's action is "clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment"); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
69 Rice, 963 F. Supp. at 1549.
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In his May 6, 1997 decision, federal District Court Judge David A.
Ezra-a Reagan appointee70-rejected Rice's arguments. Judge Ezra,
conjuring the language of Federal Indian Law, concluded that there was a
"guardian-ward" relationship between the United States and the Native
Hawaiian people, which resembled that of Native Americans throughout the
country.72 He alluded to several federal laws, including the Apology
Resolution, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, Section 5(b) of the
Hawai'i Admission Act, and recognized the "unique obligation" of the
federal government to Native Hawaiians.73 As such, Judge Ezra upheld the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs' voting requirement:
the State of Hawai'i created OHA as a means to fulfill the obligation taken
over from the federal government as part of the Admission Act. The State of
Hawai'i did not create the trust relationship with Native Hawaiians, nor did it
enact the initial legislation singling Native Hawaiians out for special
treatment. Rather, the State of Hawai'i merely enacted a reasonable method
to satisfy its obligation to utilize a portion of the proceeds from the [Section]
5(b) lands for the betterment of Native Hawaiians. This is clearly consistent
with and pursuant to Congress' mandate and intent.74
Dissatisfied, Rice appealed Judge Ezra's decision. 5 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Ezra's ruling, holding that
Hawai'i "may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom
trust obligations run and to whom [OHA] trustees owe a duty of loyalty,
should be the group to decide who the trustees ought to be," even if the
Hawai'i Constitution and implementing statutes contain a racial
classification on its face.76
Rice filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States. In a surprise to most observers, the Court granted the writ
and, thus, allowed Rice to appeal the Ninth Circuit's decision.79 Rice, a
rancher from Hawai'i,so brought his case to the largest legal stage, and was
70 Dan Nakaso, Judging Ezra: Ambition and Ability, HONOLULU ADVERTISER (May 27,
2001), http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2001/May/27/Iln/nO2a.html.
71 Rice, 963 F. Supp. at 1559.
72 id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1555.
7 Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1998).
76 Id. at 1079.
n Rice v. Cayetano, 526 U.S. 1016 (1999).
78 The Court's acceptance of certiorari surprised many because of the unanimous
decision of the district court and Ninth Circuit affirming the election procedures. See Rice v.
Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. at 1547; Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d at 1076.
79 Rice, 526 U.S. at 1016.
so Christine Donnelly, Rice: It's About Protecting the Constitution, Not 'Racist",
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not alone in the fight.8 One of his supporters was conservative attorney
Robert Bork.8 2 Bork gained national attention in the 1970s when, as acting
Attorney General under President Richard Nixon, he fired Watergate
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox for requesting Nixon's cover-up tapes. 83
HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN (Feb. 23, 2000), http://archives.starbulletin.com/2000/02/23
/news/story3.html.
s Rice was also joined on appeal by a slew of conservative organizations, including the
Campaign for a Color Blind America, Americans Against Discrimination and Preferences,
the United States Justice Foundation, and the New York Civil Rights Coalition. See Brief
for Amici Curiae Center for Equal Opportunity, New York Civil Rights Coalition, Carl
Cohen, and Abigail Thernstrom in Support of Petitioner, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495
(2000) (No. 98-818), 1999 WL 345639; Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in
Support of Petitioner, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818), 1999 WL
332717; Brief of Amici Curiae Campaign for a Color-Blind America, Americans Against
Discrimination and Preferences, and the United States Justice Foundation in Support of
Petitioner, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818), 1999 WL 374577. These
organizations, which by name suggest pro-civil rights agendas, were vehemently opposed to
affirmative action programs and outright belligerent to minority causes and rights. Edward
Blum of the Campaign for a Color Blind America ignored the century-long subjugation of
Native Hawaiians and instead tried to frame the case as a direct challenge to other minority
groups by insisting that he was "appalled that African Americans and Hispanics in Hawai[']i
are being turned away from the OHA voting polls because of their skin color." Pat
Omandam, Hawaiians Say Hearing Went Badly, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Oct. 6, 1999,
at Al, A8. Blum, who has chased and created cases challenging affirmative action programs
around the country, saw his role "to facilitate and fund" these various lawsuits challenging
affirmative action programs. Catherine Ho, The Washington Duo Behind Texas Affirmative
Action Case, THE WASHINGTON POST, (March 4, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/capitalbusiness/the-washington-duo-behind-texas-affirmative-action-case/2012/02/
28/glQAEfsrqR story.html. In his comments, and as discussed in detail below, Blum
conveniently forgot to mention that Rice was a wealthy white voter whose family assisted in
the theft of Hawaiian sovereignty. Blum's ability to bring funds to litigation has since been
responsible for two recent decisions by the Court that struck down a portion of the Voting
Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013), and reviewed affirmative
action policies in college admissions in Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
Id. Blum's biases were on full display in an amicus brief filed on behalf of his organization,
the Campaign for a Color Blind America, and Americans Against Discrimination and
Preferences, and the United States Justice Foundation. In that brief, the organizations cited
authoritatively to the work of Romanzo C. Adams, the twentieth century historian who
created the "melting pot" ideology, which has since been heavily criticized by contemporary
scholars. See JONATHAN Y. OKAMURA, ETHNICITY AND INEQUALITY IN HAWAII 8 (2008)
(criticizing Adams' melting pot ideology because it ignored the subjugation of Native
Hawaiians, Filipinos, and Samoans to allow the narratives of Caucasians, Japanese, and
Chinese to be elevated as the dominant narrative).
82 See Brief for Amici Curiae Center for Equal Opportunity, New York Civil Rights
Coalition, Carl Cohen, and Abigail Thernstrom in Support of Petitioner at 6, Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818), 1999 WL 345639, at *1 [hereinafter Bork
Brief].
83 Ethan Bronner, A Conservative Whose Supreme Court Bid Set the Senate Afire, N.Y.
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Bork again gained national attention in 1987 when his appointment by
President Ronald Reagan to serve on the Court was rejected because of his
extremist ideology.84 United States Senator Edward M. Kennedy
characterized Bork's view of America as:
[A] land in which women would be forced into back-alley abortions, blacks
would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break down
citizens' doors in midnight raids, schoolchildren could not be taught about
evolution, writers and artists could be censored at the whim of government,
and the doors of the federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of
citizens for whom the judiciary is-and is often the only-protector of the
individual rights that are the heart of our democracy.
Consistent with his past criticism of minority views,86 Bork ignored the
history of colonization against Hawaiians and instead trumpeted the
conservative rallying cry that affirmative action programs and entities, such
as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, were unconstitutional. 7  Instead of
recognizing the unique situation in Hawai'i and the clear reconciliatory
purpose that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs was intended to address, Bork
implicitly invoked a post-racial society in which everyone was equal: "The
entire [Office of Hawaiian Affairs] scheme is infused with explicit racial
quotas, exclusions, and classifications to a degree this Court has rarely
encountered in the last half-century."
On the other end of the legal battle was a diverse group of supporters of
the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' voting procedures, including the National
Congress of American Indians, Hawai'i's congressional delegation, and the
federal government, which was asked to participate in the oral arguments
before the Court.89 Tasked with defending the State's position was John G.
Roberts, Jr., an attorney with the Washington, D.C. law firm of Hogan &
Hartson LLP. Roberts' career, which eventually led to his selection as
Chief Justice of the Court by George W. Bush, traced the trajectory of the
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/us/robert-h-bork-conservative-
jurist-dies-at-85.html.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See Bork Brief, supra note 82, at *2-4.
8 Id. at *6.
89 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Congress of American Indians in Support of
the Respondent at 1, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818), 1999 WL 557271
at *1; Brief for the Hawai'i Congressional Delegation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 1, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818), 1999 WL 557289 at
*1; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818), 1999 WL 569475 at *1.
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conservative movement in America. 90  Yet, although he clerked for
conservative justice William H. Rehnquist and worked in the Reagan and
George H.W. Bush Justice Departments, Roberts advocated for Native
Hawaiians. 9' Constitutional and International Law scholars and long-time
duo Jon Van Dyke and Sherry Broder briefed the Court on behalf of the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs. 92 Given the legal fire-power brought to the
Court, the case was hailed as the "best briefed" case of the term. 9 3
The Supreme Court announced its decision on February 23, 2000.94 The
tally was seven in favor of Rice and two in favor of Cayetano. 95 Writing
for a five-member majority of the Court,9 6 Justice Anthony Kennedy-who
Reagan selected after Bork's failed confirmation 97 -overturned the decision
of the Ninth Circuit Court.98 Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice William
90 See Donnelly, supra note 80 (noting that Roberts was a partner and Hogan and
Hartson, clerked for Justice Rehnquist and then was appointed to the White House staff);
Linda Greenhouse, A Ceremonial Start to the Session as the Supreme Court Welcomes a
New Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/04/
politics/politicsspeciall /a-ceremonial-start-to-the-session-as-the-supreme.html.
91 See Donnelly, supra note 80; Oral Argument at 26:49, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495
(2000) (No. 98-818), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-818.
92 Brief of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Ka Lahui, Ass'n of Hawaiian Civic Clubs,
Council of Hawaiian Organizations, Native Hawaiian Convention, Native Hawaiian Bar
Ass'n, Native Hawaiian Legal Corp., Native Hawaiian Advisory Council, Ha Hawai'i, Hui
Kali'aina, Alu Like, Inc., and Papa Ola Lokahi as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1,
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818), 1999 WL 557287 at *1.
93 Pete Pichaske, Attorneys Spar in OHA Case, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Oct. 6,
1999, at Al, A6.
94 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 495 (2000).
95 id.
96 The Rehnquist Court continued the Burger Court's conservative bent, but shifted the
legal landscape. In regard to America's indigenous people, the Rehnquist Court has been
criticized for its hostility particularly toward Native American interests, which have been a
radical departure from Courts of the past:
In the last ten terms, Indian tribal interests have lost seventy-seven percent of all their
cases before the Rehnquist Court; they lost only thirty-six percent of their cases before
the Burger Court. Tribal interests have not won a single case before the Supreme Court
involving state jurisdiction over non-Indians, and they have lost seventy-three percent
of the cases involving tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. It is difficult to find
another class of cases or type of litigant that has fared worse before the Supreme
Court.
Jeanette Wolfley, Rice v. Cayetano: The Supreme Court Declines to Extend Federal Indian
Law Principles to Native Hawaiians Sovereign Rights, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 359,
359-60 (2002).
97 See Linda Greenhouse, Reagan Nominates Anthony Kennedy to Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/12/us/reagan-nominates-anthony-
kennedy-to-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all.
98 Rice, 598 U.S. at 497.
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Rehnquist and Associate Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia,
and Clarence Thomas. 99 Rehnquist, who was initially selected as an
associate justice by President Richard Nixon,'00 was elevated to the position
of Chief Justice by President Reagan.' 0 ' Reagan's stacking of conservative
voices on the Court continued with his appointment of the first female
justice, O'Connor,1 0 2 originalist guru, Scalia,'03 and Bork's replacement
selection, Kennedy.1 04 The fifth member of the conservative majority was
Thomas, the former chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission who was appointed by President George H.W. Bush to fill the
vacancy left by the retirement of liberal firebrand Thurgood Marshall.'0 o
Thomas' former position in the EEOC was one of the positions filled by
Reagan to ensure an anti-affirmative action regime in federal
enforcement.106 Thomas had adamantly opposed all racial preference
programs and saw affirmative action as "social engineering." 0 7  In this
matter, the right-leaning Court concluded that the voting requirement for
the Office of Hawaiian Affairs under Hawai'i law violated the Fifteenth
Amendment inasmuch as it was based entirely on a racial preference.0 8
99 Id.
100 Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Rehnquist Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/04/politics/chief-justice-rehnquist-dies-at-80.html.
101 Id.
102 Linda Greenhouse, When Sandra Day O'Connor Broke Into the Men's Club, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/opinion/when-sandra-day-
oconnor-broke-into-the-mens-club.html.
103 Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Dead at 79, POLITICO (Feb. 13,
2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/breaking-news-supreme-court-justice-
antonin-scalia-dead-at-the-age-of-79-219246.
104 See supra note 97.
105 Adam Liptak, Reticent on the Bench, But Effusive About It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2016,
at Al5.
106 TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
208 (2004).
107 id.
1os Paul Finkelman contends that Court opinions are the product of decisions by
individual justices because the justices of the Court are not social actors, but are either
"heroes or villains" in that they bring their own perspective, prejudices, and attitudes to the
bench. See Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118
HARV. L. REV. 973, 994 (2005). The result in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and
other racial cases were, according to Finkelman, a reflection of the personal views of the
justices and their decision to support Southern, rather than Northern, notions of race.
Finkelman, 118 HARV. L. REV. at 978-94. For instance, Finkelman argues that "[v]irtually
all scholars agree that the death of Chief Justice Vinson in 1953 and his replacement with
Chief Justice Earl Warren made it possible for the Court to reach a unanimous decision in
Brown with a single opinion and a unified voice." Id. at 995. Richard Kluger similarly
asserts that judges indeed bring their own biases to bear on their decisions. See RICHARD
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While the outcome was not unexpected given the composition of the
Court and their prior decisions, serious harm came from the Court's biased
and selective narrative of Hawaiian history. The Court's piece-meal
narrative was, in their own words, their way to "recount events" in
Hawaiian history relevant to the case.1 09
Ignoring Hawaiians' own creation story, the Court began with a
patronizing tale of an island people whose life was "not altogether idyllic"
and who simply found "beauty and pleasure in their island existence[.]"" 0
Despite noting that the Native Hawaiian people had "well-established
traditions and customs[,]" the Court was quick to point out that Native
Hawaiians practiced a "polytheistic religion.""' The Court could have
simply stated that Native Hawaiians developed their own religion; instead it
chose to highlight the difference between the Native Hawaiians'
polytheistic religious belief and the Euro-centric and monotheistic religious
view (Christianity) of the majority justices. In what way was noting that
Native Hawaiians had a polytheistic religion relevant to deciding the case?
It was not. Thus, the reference was a subtle, yet implicit, swipe at the lack
of Christianity, and therefore morality, of the Native Hawaiians. Moreover,
instead of characterizing the New England missionaries as cultural and
religious intruders, the Court found that those missionary families, which
included Rice's ancestors, were simply attempting to "teach Hawaiians to
abandon religious beliefs and customs that were contrary to Christian
teachings and practices."'12
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 295-305 (2004). Kluger recounts the story of J.
Waties Waring, a white federal district court judge, who was raised by ex-slaves and, after
reaching the upper echelon of society in South Carolina, was shocked at the treatment of
blacks. Id. Judge Waring took small steps toward addressing the inequality against blacks,
such as making it easier for a black individual to sit on a jury. Id. After several deplorable
cases, Judge Waring became "the black man's friend" and set precedence for future cases.
Id. at 305. Finkelman's and Kluger's positions are in stark contrast to that of Michael
Klarman, who described the Court as playing a "vanguard role" in the school desegregation
decision, Brown v. Board of Education, noting that "[m]any of [the justices] had to
overcome serious legal doubts to invalidate segregation, but fundamental changes in the
extralegal context of race relations had rendered a contrary result too unpalatable to most of
them." MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 343 (2004).
109 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 500 (2000).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 501.
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Significantly, the Court's narrative implied Native Hawaiian
acquiescence to the significant political changes that occurred in the
Kingdom from the institution of the Bayonet Constitution in 1887 through
the annexation of Hawai'i. The Court noted "[t]ensions" between the "anti-
Western, pro-native bloc" and the "Western business interests and property
owners[.]"" 3 The Court specifically alluded to tensions in response to "an
attempt by the then monarch, Queen Lili'uokalani, to promulgate a new
constitution restoring monarchical control over the House of Nobles and
limiting the franchise to Hawaiian subjects."1 4 The Court simplified and
mischaracterized the efforts of Lili'uokalani and Native Hawaiians. In
essence, the Court accused Native Hawaiians of attempting an illegal
overthrow of the government and ignored American business interests'
involvement in Kingdom governance. While Lili'uokalani did seek to
promulgate a new constitution, she did so in response to the calls of the
Hawaiian people, who had been effectively written out of society with the
foreign-imposed Bayonet Constitution in 1887." Whereas the Kingdom's
1852 Constitution provided universal suffrage to all regardless of race, the
Bayonet Constitution effectively disenfranchised Asians because of its
literacy requirements, created an income requirement that effectively
removed Native Hawaiians as eligible voters, and enfranchised white
foreigners without any requirement that they renounce their former
allegiance or naturalize as subjects of the Kingdom.1 6 Put simply, the
Bayonet Constitution, which received its name because of the threat of
violence that the white instigators promised if then-monarch Kallkaua
refused to sign, provided "grossly disproportionate political power" to
white business interests." 7  It was all a part of the "Anglo-Saxonizing
Machine" that the missionary descendants viewed as supreme:
We declare to [Native Hawaiians] that the Anglicized civilization is
settled in this country and is inevitably to prevail. Their only good prospect
is heartily to fall in line with it, earnestly to study and diligently to practice
all that is pure, just, true, lovely, and of good report in these thoughts,
customs and habits of the haole."1
113 Id. at 504.
114 Id.
115 LILI'UOKALANI, HAWAII'S STORY BY HAWAII'S QUEEN 226-36 (1898).
"6 See, e.g., HAw. KINGDOM CONST. arts. 59, 62 (1887).
117 Yamamoto and Betts, supra note 61, at 560 (citation omitted).
118 S.E. Bishop, Anglo-Saxonizing Machines, THE FRIEND, August 1887, at 63.
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Conspirator Lorrin A. Thurston understood the illegality of his actions
and attempted to justify their treasonous acts by alluding to images of the
American Revolution: "Unquestionably, the [Bayonet] constitution was not
in accordance with law; neither was the Declaration of Independence from
Great Britain. Both were revolutionary documents, which had to be
forcibly effected and forcibly maintained."" 9 This "tension" was erased
from the Rice majority's opinion.
The Court noted that a Committee of Safety with the "active assistance"
of an American minister to Hawai'i, John Stevens, and American armed
forces "replaced the monarchy with a provisional government," and that
Queen Lili'uokalani "could not resume her former place," which led to the
establishment of the Republic of Hawai'i.1 2 0 Again, the Court simplified
history and wholly ignored that "replac[ing]" the monarchy involved direct
threats of violence to the Native Hawaiian people.121 Indeed, the
characterization of American involvement in the overthrow as "active
assistance" downplayed the landing of American Marines and
Lili'uokalani's formal protests to President Grover Cleveland and the
American Congress.1 22 The Court ignored the American investigation and
July 1893 Blount Report that found that the "United States diplomatic and
military representatives had abused their authority and were responsible for
the change in government."1 23 The Court ignored the subsequent effort by
members of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee to discredit the
findings of the Blount Report by cobbling together pro-annexationist
testimony in Hawai'i into another report.124 That subsequent Morgan
Report, made at the request of Foreign Relations Chairman,1 25 racial
segregationist and Ku Klux Klan leader John Tyler Morgan,1 2 6 attempted to
exonerate American involvement in the overthrow.1 27 While it may have
swayed some uninformed and pro-annexationist leaders at the time, the
119 LORRIN THURSTON, MEMOIRS OF THE HAWAIIAN REVOLUTION 153 (1936)
120 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 505 (2000).
121 id.
122
122 LILI'UOKALANI, supra note 115, at 335-40.
123 S.J. Res. 19, 103d Cong. (1993), Pub. L. No. 103-150, § 1, 107 Stat. 1510, 1513
[hereinafter Apology Resolution]; see also James Blount, Report of the Commissioner to the
Hawaiian Islands, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 53-47 (1893).
124 See SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, S.
Rep. No. 227 (1894) [hereinafter Morgan Report].
125 PETER TRUBOWITZ, DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST: CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 267 n. 103 (1998) (noting that Morgan was chairman of the
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee "and a champion of imperialism").
126 SUSAN LAWRENCE DAVIS, AUTHENTIC HISTORY: Ku KLUX KLAN, 1865-1877, at 45
(1924).
127 See Morgan Report, supra note 124.
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Morgan Report has been sternly criticized for its slanted and imperialist
agenda. 12 Yet, instead of recounting these American investigations, Justice
Kennedy's opinion simply ignored them.
The Court failed to mention the overwhelming resistance to American
annexation by Lili'uokalani and Native Hawaiians. Following the
overthrow, Lili'uokalani made several trips to the United States to seek
assistance in reinstating her government.1 2 9 While the Court mentioned a
"Joint Resolution" that annexed Hawai'i to the United States in 1898,130 it
failed to justify how such a "Joint Resolution" could annex another
sovereign entity and have binding effect like a treaty. The Court wholly
ignored the 21,000 Native Hawaiian signatures, which represented well
over half of the adult Hawaiians at the time, obtained on a petition
protesting an annexation treaty that was sent to the United States Senate and
ultimately led to the proposed-treaty's defeat.' 3 '
The Court's biases were also on full display through its description and
characterization of Plaintiff Freddy Rice. First, in a very different way that
a citizen of California is a Californian, the Court characterized Rice as a
"citizen of Hawai[']i and thus himself a Hawaiian in a well-accepted sense
of the term."13 2 The characterization of Rice as "Hawaiian" trivialized what
it means to be "Hawaiian" as most Hawai'i citizens recognize that
"Hawaiian" refers to a person of Native Hawaiian ancestry. It was, as
Professor Chris lijima noted, "misinformed, biased, and plainly wrong."'33
Second, the Court described Rice as a "descendant of pre-annexation
residents of the islands."13 4 It failed to account for the role played by the
Rice family in the subjugation of Native Hawaiians throughout the
nineteenth century. For example, it was Rice's great-great grandparents
William Harrison Rice and Mary Sophia Hyde Rice who voyaged to
Hawai'i to preach their religious values-values that they believed needed
to be taken to the "savage" indigenous people in much the same way that
Mary's father brought Christian values to the Seneca Indian tribe. 3 5 After
arriving in Hawai'i, William ended up doing well by amassing land and
128 See VAN DYKE, supra note 60, at 168-69.
129 LILI'UOKALANI, supra note 115, at 313-40.
130 "Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States,"
ch. 55, 30 Stat. 750, 751 (1898).
131 VAN DYKE, supra note 60, at 209-11.
132 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000).
133 Chris K. lijima, Race Over Rice: Binary Analytical Boxes and a Twenty-First
Century Endorsement of Nineteenth Century Imperialism in Rice v. Cayetano, 53 RUTGERS
L. REv. 91, 104 (2000).
134 Rice, 528 U.S. at 510.
135 HAWAII MISSION CHILD. Soc'Y, PORTRAITS OF AMERICAN PROTESTANT MISSIONARIES
TO HAWAII 75 (1901).
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money from the growing sugar industry on Kaua'i.1 3 6  William, who
supervised the creation of the first irrigation ditch in Hawai'i, was also
responsible for diverting the natural flow of water from native farmers to
ensure the sustainability of the sugar plantation.1 37 That diversion, when
repeated throughout the Hawaiian Islands, effectively cut-off native farmers
from water and all but ensured the demise of their crops, ensured a reliance
on a western economic structure, and eviscerated the Hawaiian culture and
way of life.1 38 When combined with the results of western land tenure in
the Mdhele,1 39 William's diversion of water in favor of plantations closed
the door on native control of their land and resources.140
William's children immersed themselves in the fabric of western control
in Hawai'i. William's daughters, Maria and Anna, married white-
missionary descendants that went on to form companies like AMFAC and
Castle & Cooke l41-two of the "Big Five" companies that controlled the
Hawaiian economy for decades, in what some have characterized as the
most consolidated system of power throughout the United States.1 4 2
William's son (and Freddy Rice's great-grandfather), William Hyde Rice,
continued the family business and amassed a large portion of land on
Kaua'i (at one point being one of the top ten lands owners on the island).1 4 3
William Hyde eventually entered politics and became a member of the
Kingdom's House of Representatives. 144 Despite his role as a politician for
the Kingdom, William Hyde was instrumental in drafting the Bayonet
Constitution of 1887, which, forced upon Kaldkaua, stripped the monarch
of substantial power and disenfranchised native voters in favor of white
control.1 4 5  Clearly, generations of the Rice Family played key roles
implementing and enforcing laws and practices that benefitted white-
Americans at the expense of Native Hawaiians. The Rice Court, however,
conveniently left this context out of its decision.
136 Id.
137 CAROL WILCOX, SUGAR WATER: HAWAII'S PLANTATION DITCHES 70 (1996).
138 Id.
139 See Jonathan K.K. Osorio & Kamanamaikalani Beamer, Sullying the Scholar's Craft:
An Essay and Criticism ofJudge James S. Burns' Crown Lands Trust Article, 39 U. H[Aw. L.
REV. 469, 470 (2017).
140 See WILCOX, supra note 137 at 70.
141 EDWARD T. JONES, NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN, 1607-1950: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY 377-78 (1971).
142 Id.
143 GEORGE F. NELLIST, THE STORY OF HAWAII AND ITS BUILDERS 171-73 (1925).
144 Id.
145 HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY
IN HAWAI'I 14 (1993).
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These glaring omissions are likely the result of a majority on the Court
who had clear political and historical biases.1 4 6 Indeed, the Court's bias
was epitomized in its description of the historical background, in which the
Court noted two "important matters[.]"1 47 First, the Court concluded that
the introduction of western diseases was "no doubt" a "cause of the despair,
disenchantment, and despondency ... in descendants of the early Hawaiian
people."1 48 1In other words, disregard America's involvement in the
overthrow and subjugation of the Hawaiian political body, disregard
America's suppression of Hawaiian language, culture, and history,
disregard the theft of Hawaiian land and resources, and instead accept that
the current socio-economic struggles were the result of a people that could
not survive that Darwinian notion of survival of the fittest. Second, the
Court concluded its re-telling of Hawaiian history by highlighting the influx
of immigrants to the islands. 149 Justice Kennedy highlighted the following
immigrant groups that were brought to Hawai'i: "Chinese, Portuguese,
Japanese, and Filipinos[.]", 5 0 At no time did the Court refer to Americans
and other Western individuals as "immigrants." In the eyes of the Court,
Americans-including Freddy Rice's missionary ancestors-were
"settlers" not "immigrants"; Americans were, as Professor Iijma interpreted
the Court's specific terminology, the "rightful and natural heirs to the land
of Hawai[']i" and not just another ethnic group coming to the islands for
work.' 5 ' It is then not surprising that the Court concluded: "Each of these
ethnic and national groups has had its own history in Hawai[']i, its own
struggles with societal and official discrimination, its own successes, and its
own role in creating the present society of the islands." 52 The Court's
message was clear: if everyone else could do it, so too could the Native
Hawaiians.
146 The legitimacy of the Court is in jeopardy with its cherry-picked narratives of the
history of oppressed communities. One scholar noted, "[i]t is the judiciary that is the
gatekeeper of how history is relevant to the respective case or controversy, the maimer in
which history in law is applied, and what historical evidence is to be admitted." Patrick J.
Charles, History in Law, Mythmaking, and Constitutional Legitimacy, 63 CLEVELAND STATE
L. REV. 23, 37 (2014). That responsibility is severely curtailed when the Court selectively
decides what occurred in the past. When the Court (and the judiciary in general) lose
legitimacy, the public is less likely to accept its pronouncements as authoritative. The Court
is no longer respected as a neutral arbiter, but rather as a political body subject to the fanciful
whims of the majority of its members.
147 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 506 (2000).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 lijima, supra note 133, at 103.
152 Rice, 528 U.S. at 506.
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As if the Court's stinging mischaracterization of nineteenth and early
twentieth century Hawaiian history were not enough, it then made a
decision regarding the Office of Hawaiian Affairs without adequately
analyzing the agency's unique history and its role in the Hawaiian
community.1 53 Surprisingly, the Court failed to mention the reconciliatory
purpose for which the Office of Hawaiian Affairs was created and
conveniently left out from its opinion the fact that the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs (and its constitutional foundation) was voted for and approved by a
majority of citizens of the multi-ethnic State of Hawai'i in 1978.154
When it pleased the Court, it found certain Congressional and
jurisprudential "historical conclusions . . . persuasive[.]", 55  For example,
the Court ignored the Congressional mandate in the Admissions Act that
the State hold lands in trust for the native Hawaiians.156 As the dissenting
opinion of Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted, "it is
a painful irony indeed to conclude that native Hawaiians are not entitled to
special benefits designed to restore a measure of native self-governance
because they currently lack any vestigial native government-a possibility
of which history and the actions of this Nation have deprived them." 5 7 In
another example of the Court's selective nature, while quick to cite to
legislative history from the enactment of the Hawaiian Homes Commission
Act that declared Native Hawaiians as "wards," 5 the Court all but ignored
the federal Apology Resolution that set forth Congressional and
Presidential apologies for the actions of Americans with the overthrow of
the Kingdom and called for reconciliatory efforts between Native
Hawaiians and the United States.1 59 The Court failed to recognize that an
American law clearly stated that Native Hawaiians "never directly
relinquished their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over
their national lands to the United States, either through their monarchy or
through a plebiscite or referendum[.]"1 60 It, therefore, is not surprising that
Justice Scalia had the following colloquy with Rice's attorney, Ted Olson,
about the significance (or lack thereof) of the Apology Resolution:
153 See Troy J.H. Andrade, Changing Tides: A Political and Legal History of the Office
of Hawaiian Affairs (May 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai'i at
Manoa) (on file with author).
154 See supra note 53.
155 Rice, 528 U.S. at 501.
156 Admission Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 2, 73 Stat. 4, 4.
157 Id. at 535 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
158 Id. at 511 (citation omitted).
159 See Apology Resolution, supra note 123.
160 Id.
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Scalia: You mean you're contradicting the congressional resolution
that said we're guilty? Do we have to accept
that . . . resolution as an accurate description of history?
Olson: Of course, and this Court ...
Scalia: Can't Congress make history? [Laughter in the audience]
Olson: Congress does make history, but Congress, of course, can't
change history. I'm . .. not accepting everything that's in the
so-called Apology Resolution.161
For some, like Scalia and his conservative colleagues, Congress'
recitation of Hawaiian history was not binding and the Court could, on its
own, write history.
Given its tailored view of Hawai'i political and legal history, it was clear
the direction that the Court was headed. It concluded that the voting
scheme for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, although argued as being based
on ancestry, was a racial classification: "The State, in enacting the
legislation before us, has used ancestry as a racial definition and for a racial
purpose."1 6 2 The Court then made the bold pronouncement that reflected
the conservative mantra of picking oneself up by the bootstraps: "One of
the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it
demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead
of by his or her own merit and essential qualities." 63
Justice Kennedy concluded with a stinging rebuke of Hawaiians and a
paternalistic and patriotic message:
When the culture and way of life of a people are all but engulfed by a history
beyond their control, their sense of loss may extend down through
generations; and their dismay may be shared by many members of the larger
community. As the State of Hawai[']i attempts to address these realities, it
must, as always, seek the political consensus that begins with a sense of
shared purpose. One of the necessary beginning points is this principle: The
Constitution of the United States, too, has become the heritage of all the
citizens of Hawai[']i.1 64
161 Rice Oral Argument, supra note 45, at *14.
162 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 515 (2000).
163 Id. at 517. The Court added that the State's argument failed because it rested on the
"demeaning" premise that citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified than
others to vote on certain matters. Id. at 498.
164 Id. at 524.
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The harm from the Rice decision, much like that of the successive
generations of the Rice Family, comes from a legitimization of American
superiority over indigenous peoples. The Rice Court "turned a blind eye to
history."1 6 5 As Justice Stevens, in his scathing dissent, wrote: "The Court's
holding today rests largely on the repetition of glittering generalities that
have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the State of
Hawai[']i."1 66 Another scholar argued that "[i]f there is a textbook case in
which majoritarian perspectives and racial norms masquerade as neutral
narrative, it is the Rice decision."1 6 7
Following the decision, Rice boldly professed, "I'm proud to be part of
Hawai[']i's history ... It was good for Hawaiians, and certainly good for
the state. Got everybody thinking. Hawaiians took advantage of being able
to play the part of victim and get entitlements based on race. They stepped
over the line. The Rice decision made everyone step back."1 68 Rice and the
Court's decision indeed made Hawaiians "step back."1 69
B. Revising and Copying History
Nine years later, Native Hawaiians and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
again appeared before the Court.1 70 This time, the State of Hawai'i applied
and was granted certiorari on a decision by the Hawai'i Supreme Court that
enjoined the sale of Ceded Lands until Native Hawaiian claims to the land
were settled.' 7 ' While the Hawai'i Supreme Court recounted a Hawaiian
past reflecting the effects of colonialism on Hawaiians, the history told by
the United States Supreme Court in its opinion downplayed the procedural
history of the case and, again, provided a jaded view of Hawai'i's legal and
political history.
165 Eric K. Yamamoto, The Colonizer's Story: The Supreme Court Violates Native
Hawaiian Sovereignty-Again, COLORLINES (August 20, 2000), http://www.colorlines.com/
articles/colonizers-story-supreme-court-violates-native-hawaiian-sovereignty-again.
166 Rice, 528 U.S. at 527-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167 lijima, supra note 133, at 98.
168 Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 61, at 546 (citation omitted).
169 Attorney Roberts saw the decision as a victory: "The good news is that the majority's
opinion was very narrowly written and expressly did not call into question the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs, the public trust for the benefit of Hawaiians and native Hawaiians, but
only the particular voting mechanism by which the trustees are selected." Helen Altonn &
Christine Donnelly, Top Court Backs Rice in OHA Vote Challenge, HONOLULU STAR-
BULLETIN, Feb. 23, 2000, at Al, A8-A9.
170 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Hawai'i, 117 Hawai'i
174, 177 P.3d 884 (2008) [hereinafter HCDCH1].
171 id.
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In 1987, the Housing Finance and Development Corporation
("HFCD")-an entity created by the State of Hawai'i to remedy the critical
housing shortage facing the community-examined parcels around the
State and selected two sites for future development of housing projects.1 72
The two sites, Leiali'i in West Maui and La'i 'Opua in North Kona on
Hawai'i Island, were both on Ceded Lands.1 73  After obtaining the
necessary approvals, the HFDC began a residential housing development
project at Leiali'i.1 74 Pursuant to State law, specifically Hawai'i Revised
Statutes Section 10-13.6, and consistent with the determination of its share
of Ceded Land revenues, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs was to be
compensated twenty-percent of the fair market value of both parcels. 7 5
Following passage of the Apology Resolution (acknowledging that "the
indigenous Hawaiian people never relinquished their claims . . . over their
national lands to the United States"),1 76 the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
demanded "that a disclaimer be included as part of any acceptance of funds
from the sale so as to preserve any native Hawaiian claims to ownership of
the ceded lands[.]" 77
In October 1994, the State balked at putting in such a disclaimer because
"to do so would place a cloud on title, rendering title insurance unavailable
to buyers in the [Leiali'i] project."7 7 The State Department of Land and
Natural Resources thereafter transferred the land to HFDC for $1.00, and
sent the Office of Hawaiian Affairs a check for $5,573,604.40 as its twenty-
percent share of the fair market value of the land. 179 The Office of
Hawaiian Affairs refused to accept the check, and, along with several
Native Hawaiian individuals, filed suit in State court seeking to halt the sale
of all ceded lands because the "alienation of the land to a third-party would
erode the ceded lands trust and the entitlements of the native Hawaiian
people."so As one attorney asserted, "Those lands may be part of some
major settlement, so to lease them now or dispose of them will definitely
affect what's available for a settlement in the future[.]"' Then-Chairman
Clayton Hee provided the rationale for filing suit against the State:
172 Id. at 896.
173 Id. at 897.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 895.
177 Id. at 897.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 897-98.
80 Id. at 898.
181 Gary Kubota, On Hold: Land Disposition Issues at the Proposed Site of a Maui
Subdivision Leave Potential Buyers Out in the Cold, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, July 28,
2000, at Al, A8 (quoting Melody K. MacKenzie).
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What is being disputed is whether the state had the legal right to dispose of
ceded lands at no compensation to the public land trust. . . . This is the first
case where the Office of Hawaiian Affairs has taken a proactive step to
prevent the state from reducing the inventory of public lands.182
The trial court heard evidence regarding the transfer of the land, the
importance of the land to the Hawaiian community, analogies to Native
American property rights, and evidence from the State that it was
authorized to sell ceded lands from the public land trust.'8 3 The court
issued an opinion concluding that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' claims
were barred by various legal doctrines and that the "State had the express
authority to alienate ceded lands from the public lands trust." 8 4 The Office
of Hawaiian Affairs appealed.1 5
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Ronald T.Y. Moon-the
nation's first Korean-American Chief Justice' 86-reversed the trial court's
decision by relying upon a reading of State laws and the Apology
Resolution. The court first reviewed the language of the Apology
Resolution, in which Congress and the President determined:
Whereas the Republic of Hawai[']i also ceded 1,800,000 acres of crown,
government and public lands of the Kingdom of Hawai[']i, without the
consent of or compensation to the Native Hawaiian people of Hawai[7i or
their sovereign government;
Whereas the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their
claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to
the United States, either through their monarchy or through a plebiscite or
referendum;
Whereas the Native Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop and
transmit to future generations their ancestral territory, and their cultural
identity in accordance with their own spiritual and traditional beliefs,
customs, practices, language, and social institutions.1
182 Id.
183 HCDCHI, 117 Hawai'i at 188, 177 P.3d at 898.
184 Id. at 899.
185 Id.
186 Nicole Kato, Ronald Moon, MIDWEEK (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.midweek.com/
ronald-moon/.
187 Apology Resolution, supra note 123, at §3, 107 Stat. 1512-13.
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Although the Apology Resolution contained a statement that "Nothing in
[it] is intended to serve as a settlement of any claims against the United
States," the political branches (Congress and the President) undoubtedly
expressed a "commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the
overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai[']i, in order to provide a proper
foundation for reconciliation between the United States and the Native
Hawaiian people."' Thus, under a plain reading, the standard used to
interpret legislative intent,' 89 the Apology Resolution was, as others have
recognized, "more than a policy statement."' 90 While it expressly did not
constitute a settlement, it evidenced a federal intent to reconcile with the
Hawaiian community.
Chief Justice Moon latched onto that concept and held that although the
Apology Resolution did not, on its face, constitute a settlement of claims, it
did serve as a "foundation (or starting point) for reconciliation," which he
then noted included "the future settlement of the plaintiffs' unrelinquished
claims."' 9' With that one sentence, the Hawai'i Supreme Court took a step
where no other court had gone before; it recognized that the words of the
Apology Resolution created a direct acknowledgment and acceptance by
the United State of a commitment to reconciliation with Native Hawaiians.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court, thus, halted the sale or transfer of ceded lands
to third parties "until the claims of the native Hawaiians to the ceded lands
have been resolved."1 92 The pronouncement by a unanimous court was a
victory for the Hawaiian community; there was an official stop to the
alienation of ceded lands and, more importantly, a judicial recognition that
Native Hawaiians had outstanding claims that needed to be dealt with by
the State.
But, the brilliance of the decision was that it firmly situated its rationale
upon federal law and on independent State law grounds. Specifically, the
Hawai'i Supreme Court relied upon Acts 354, 359, 329 and 340 to conclude
that the State has made commitments to reconcile with Native Hawaiians
that need to be adhered to. 193 In Act 354, the State recognized that "many
native Hawaiians feel there is a valid claim for reparations[,]"
acknowledged that "the actions by the United States were illegal and
188 Id. § 3, 107 Stat. 1514.
189 See State ex rel. Louie v. Hawaii Gov't Emps. Ass'n, 133 Hawai'i 385, 400, 328 P.3d
394, 409 (2014) (citations omitted) ("It is well-established that the 'fundamental starting
point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself.").
190 Eric K. Yamamoto & Sara D. Ayabe, Courts in the "Age of Reconciliation": Office
of Hawaiian Affairs v. HCDCH, 33 U. HAw. L. REv. 503, 517 (2011).
191 HCDCHI, 117 Hawai'iat 192, 177 P.3d at 902.
192 Id. at 218, 177 P.3d at 928.
193 Id. at 193-94, 177 P.3d at 903-04.
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immoral," and "pledge[d] its continued support to the native Hawaiian
community by taking steps to promote the restoration of the rights and
dignity of native Hawaiians."1 94 In Act 359, the State recognized in 1993
that "the indigenous people of Hawai[']i were denied . .. their lands," and
committed to "facilitate the efforts of native Hawaiians to be governed by
an indigenous sovereign nation of their own choosing."1 9 5 In 1997, the
Legislature passed Act 329, in which the State recognized:
that the lasting reconciliation so desired by all people of Hawai'i is possible
only if it fairly acknowledges the past while moving into Hawai[']i's
future.... [O]ver the last few decades, the people of Hawai[']i through
amendments to their state constitution, the acts of their legislature, and other
means, have moved substantially toward this permanent reconciliation.196
The State also recognized its continued commitment "toward a
comprehensive, just, and lasting resolution" with the Native Hawaiian
community.1 97 Finally, upon return of the island of Kaho'olawe to the State
from bombing activities by the federal government, the State committed in
Act 340 to "transfer management and control of the island and its waters to
the sovereign native Hawaiian entity upon its recognition by the United
States and the State of Hawai'i."1 98
For the Moon Court, taking these various State laws together evidenced a
commitment by the State to reconciliation with Native Hawaiians; it was a
commitment that the court took seriously to enforce. For the Hawai'i
Supreme Court, the issue of ceded lands was fundamental to reconciliation
between the State and the Native Hawaiian community because of the
importance of land to Hawaiians:
Aina, or land, is of crucial importance to the Native Hawaiian People-to
their culture, their religion, their economic self-sufficiency and their sense of
personal and community well-being. Aina is a living and vital part of the
Native Hawaiian cosmology, and is irreplaceable. The natural elements-
land, air, water, ocean-are interconnected and interdependent. To Native
Hawaiians, land is not a commodity; it is the foundation of their cultural and
spiritual identity as Hawaiians. The aina is part of their ohana, and they are
for it as they do for other members of their families. For them, the land and
the natural environment is alive, respected, treasured, praised, and even
worshiped. 199
194 Act Relating to Hawaiian Sovereignty, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 999-1000.
195 Id. at 1010.
196 Id. at 956.
197 id.
198 Act Relating to the Island of Kaho'olawe, §2, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 806.
199 HCDCHI, 117 Hawai'i at 214, 177 P.3d at 924.
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The Moon Court also enshrined in precedent the Hawaiian cultural
importance of land to Hawaiians and their identity by quoting testimony of
Native Hawaiian cultural practitioner, Olive Kanahele:
The land itself is the deity, Pele. The land itself was made from fire and it
comes from out of the earth. And, you know, I can give you a little
genealogy of the Pele family. The Pele family comes from-the mythological
genealogy of the Pele family is that the mother is Haumea, she is the Mother
Earth, she is the earth and all of these children are born from different parts of
her. Pele is born from the natural channel of a female, she comes from the
womb. And so her responsibility is to go back into the womb of the mother
and-and bring out all of these things that we call land, that we call magma
and lava and eventually will become land. One of the-one of the most
amazing literary work that we have is the kumulipo. The kumulipo spans
generations of people. And the first era of the kumulipo, the very first line of
the kumulipo talks about the making of the earth. And why does it have to be
earth, you ask me? It has to be earth because as man we need-we need land
to live on. That is-that is our foundation. And for the native Hawaiian,
more than the family, land is their foundation. Land is their identity.200
Given the State and federal governments' commitments to true
reconciliation with the Hawaiian community and the clear harm that would
come to Native Hawaiians by the sale or transfer of the land, Chief Justice
Moon determined that the State could no longer alienate the ceded lands:
"we believe, and therefore, hold that the Apology Resolution and related
state legislation . .. give rise to the State's fiduciary duty to preserve the
corpus of the public lands trust, specifically, the ceded lands, until such
time as the unrelinquished claims of the native Hawaiians have been
resolved." 2 0 ' The decision was a victory for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
and the Hawaiian community.
Celebration for the watershed decision, however, was quickly quelled
when Governor Linda Lingle and her administration appealed the decision
to the United States Supreme Court.2 02 The Office of Hawaiian Affairs
requested that Lingle withdraw the appeal, but the Administration
refused. 203 Lingle's attorney general, Mark Bennett, argued that the State
should have unfettered discretion to sell or transfer ceded lands.204
200 Id. at 215, 177 P.3d at 925 (ellipses omitted).
201 Id. at 195, 177 P.3d at 905.
202 Hawai'i v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 554 U.S. 944 (2008).
203 Rowena Akana, State of Hawai'i v. OHA: Showdown in Washington, D.C., KA WAI
OLA o OHA (Mar. 2009), http://www.rowenaakana.org/state-of-hawai`/`e2%/0800%`99i-v-oha-
showdown-in-washington-d-c/.
204 Ken Kobayashi, Battle Over Ceded Lands, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Feb. 22,
2009, at 1, 11.
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In an opinion by Associate Justice Samuel Alito, a unanimous Supreme
Court struck down the Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision to the extent that
it relied upon the Apology Resolution.2 05 Justice Alito began his opinion by
first citing to the Rice decision's discussion of Hawaiian political
history2 06-thereby demonstrating the Court's commitment to the principle
of stare decisis. Although Rice and HCDCH dealt with two wholly separate
issues-elections and land alienation, respectively-the Court's recitation
207
of history in Office of Hawaiian Affairs mirrored the tact taken in Rice.
As in Rice, in Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Justice Alito noted how the
Committee of Safety-again, the organization of white citizens opposed to
the Queen's push for, among other things, the enfranchisement of her
people-"replaced" the Hawaiian monarchy with the provisional
government.208 The Court, again, failed to acknowledge that "replac[ing]"
the Kingdom government meant the American threat of violence upon a
sovereign independent country that was a fully integrated member of the
* 209family of nations.
The Court then articulated the chain of title to the lands of Hawai'i,
beginning with the Newlands Resolution, the Organic Act, and the
Admissions Act.210 Again, missing from its discussion of the United States'
"absolute fee" in Hawai'i was the Hawaiian opposition to annexation.211
Omitted from the Court's historical recitation was the vehement opposition
to the Newlands Resolution as a proper means to annex a sovereign
212
government. Also missing from the Court's history was the Territory of
Hawai'i's clear project of Americanization, in which Hawaiian language
was banned in schools and a program of patriotism was adopted to
indoctrinate the youth.213
205 See generally Hawai'i v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009).
206 Id. at 166-67.
207 See supra Section III.C.
208 Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. at 166-67.
209 See Apology Resolution, supra note 123, at 1510-11.
210 Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. at 167-68.
211 See generally NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED: NATIVE HAWAIIAN RESISTANCE
TO AMERICAN COLONIALISM 145-59 (2004) (detailing the 1897 petitions protesting
annexation).
212 See Chang, supra note 5, at 78-83 (citations omitted).
213 See Act of June 8, 1896, § 30, 1896 Haw. Sess. Laws 189. The Act states:
The English Language shall be the medium and basis of instruction in all public and
private schools, provided that where it is desired that another language shall be taught
in addition to the English language, such instruction may be authorized by the
Department, either by its rules, the curriculum of the school, or by direct order in any
particular instance. Any schools that shall not conform to the provisions of this section
shall not be recognized by the Department.
Id.
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After its historical diatribe on the political history of Hawai'i, the Court
then discussed the "various observations" about Hawaiian history contained
214in the Apology Resolution. In other words, the Apology Resolution,
which was enacted by Congress and signed by President Clinton on
November 23, 1993, was not, according to the Court, a valid narrative of
historical facts; they were simply "observations." 215  The Court held that
these statements did not create any substantive rights.216 Erased from this
narrative of history were the steps that the Clinton Administration took,
because of the Apology Resolution, to begin the process of reconciliation
with Native Hawaiians, including the publishing of a joint report of the
federal Justice and Interior Departments noting that "passage of the
Apology Resolution was the first step in the reconciliation process." 2 17
Nevertheless, based upon its opinion that the Apology Resolution contained
only "preambular" clauses and "conciliatory or precatory" language, the
Court made it clear that the Apology Resolution did not provide a basis for
Native Hawaiian claims to the ceded lands: "the State Supreme Court
incorrectly held that Congress, by adopting the Apology Resolution, took
away from the citizens of Hawai[']i the authority to resolve an issue that is
of great importance to the people of the State." 2 18
214 Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. at 168.
215 id.
216 The Office of Hawaiian Affairs, again represented by a slew of attorneys, including
Professor Van Dyke, argued that they had "broader moral and political claims for
compensation for the wrongs of the past." Brief for the Respondents at 18, 40, Hawai'i v
Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009) (No. 07-1372), 2009 WL 181534 (U.S.), at
**18, 40. ("There is nothing unusual about such moral and political claims; when Congress
established the Indian Claims Commission, it expressly conferred authority on the
Commission to consider that type of claims." (citations omitted)). The Court simply rejected
the argument, stating, "But we have no authority to decide questions of Hawaiian law or to
provide redress for past wrongs except as provided for by federal law." Office of Hawaiian
Affairs, 556 U.S. at 177.
217 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR AND U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FROM MAUKA TO MAKAI:
THE RIVER OF JUSTICE MUST FLOW FREELY: REPORT ON THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS
BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND NATIVE HAWAIIANS i (Oct. 23, 2000). The
Report states:
In 1993, with Public Law 103-150, the Apology Resolution, the United States
apologized to the Native Hawaiian people for the overthrow of the Kingdom of
Hawai'i in 1893 and expressed its commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of
the overthrow in order to provide a proper foundation for reconciliation between the
United States and the Native Hawaiian people. The passage of the Apology Resolution
was the first step in this reconciliation process.
Id. (emphasis added).
218 Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. at 177.
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Interestingly, the Court also concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to
rule on the State law bases for the moratorium on the sale of ceded lands,
and remanded the case to the Hawai'i Supreme Court. 21 9 But before the
Hawai'i Supreme Court could affirm its holding on solely a State law
rationale, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, the State, and most of the
individual Native Hawaiian plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement
through passage of Senate Bill 1677, which required the vote of two-thirds
of both chambers of the Legislature and the signature of the Governor to
alienate ceded lands.220 In a joint statement, Attorney General Bennett and
Office of Hawaiian Affairs Chairwoman Apoliona stated:
There is no question that OHA and the state had significant differences with
regard to this lawsuit. This settlement resolves those differences in a way we
believe is beneficial to all citizens of Hawai'i. We can now concentrate on
working together on matters we all believe are crucially important to
Hawai'i.... We look forward to doing so. 221
One plaintiff, Professor Jonathan K. Osorio, refused to settle the lawsuit
because he believed, accurately so, that the Hawai'i Supreme Court could
reaffirm its moratorium solely on State law grounds and without reference
222to the Apology Resolution. However, the Hawai'i Supreme Court's
reconsideration of their decision in regards to Osorio was dismissed on
procedural grounds because the political branches had reached a settlement
in which the Leiali'i parcels would not be sold, and therefore, the claims for
223
a moratorium were no longer ripe for adjudication. It was, thus, clear
that the political settlement reached usurped the Hawai'i Supreme Court's
opportunity to affirm the moratorium solely under Acts 354, 359, 329 and
340.
219 Id. The insistence on ruling on only the federal law grounds was likely the result of
the liberal bloc's insistence on narrowing the opinion. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral
Argument at 6, Hawai'i v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009) (No. 07-1372)
2009 WL 462660, at *6 ("JUSTICE GINSBURG: ... Why isn't it sufficient just to say that
this resolution has no substantive effect, period, and then remand to the Hawai[']i Supreme
Court?").
220 See Act Relating to Lands Controlled by the State, § 2, 2009 Haw. Sess. Laws
706-07.
221 Gordon Y.K. Pang, State, OHA, 3 Plaintiffs Settle Ceded Lands Suit, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, May 6, 2009, at A2.
222 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp., 121 Hawai'i 324, 328, 219
P.3d 1111, 1115 (2009).
223 Id.
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Instead, in regards to the alienation of ceded lands, the Hawaiian
community was left to the mercy of State lawmakers. The settlement,
which the Office of Hawaiian Affairs agreed to, while politically expedient,
harmed the Native Hawaiian interest in ceded lands. The Moon decision
represented a paradigm shift in the push for justice and reconciliation for
Native Hawaiians as it broadcasted unified support from Hawai'i's highest
court that it would hold the State to its reconciliation commitments. The
Office of Hawaiian Affairs ignored the Hawai'i Supreme Court's opinion
and simply gave up after its fifteen-year legal battle. As Osorio stated, "I
hope they understand how much they have betrayed not just the interests of
the (Hawaiian) nation but their own interests, because they are not willing
to fight." 2 24 The Office of Hawaiian Affairs unfortunately underestimated
the true reconciliatory power that the Hawai'i Supreme Court asserted and
would have likely asserted again.
C. Consequences ofFlawed History
Rice and Office of Hawaiian Affairs illustrate the significant flaws in the
Court's recitation of history and its use of history as a tool to reach its
desired outcome. The harm from the Court's contorted recitation of history
is twofold: first, it enshrines an inaccurate history that is binding, unless
overturned, on all other courts within the federal system; and second, it
mandates a history that instills fear for future repercussions and, thereby,
forces a people to take action that may not be consistent with their interests.
1. Stare Decisis and Lawyering Complications
The harm from decisions like Rice and Office of Hawaiian Affairs is the
binding effect that they have on future decisions of any federal court. As
one scholar noted, "The United States Supreme Court is the only institution
in human experience that has the power to declare history: that is, to
articulate some understanding of the past and then compel the rest of
society to conform its behavior to that understanding." 225 In addition,
"Principles of stare decisis operate upon these essays to render them
extremely difficult to overrule." 22 6 For example, as of the writing of this
Article, Rice has been cited for various propositions in over one hundred
cases. While a significant portion of the cases citing Rice deal with Native
224 David Shapiro, Ceded Lands: It's Time to Move On, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, May
27, 2009, at A12.
225 Wiecek, supra note 26, at 227-28.
226 Richards, supra note 26, at 889.
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Hawaiian issues,227 the harms of which were discussed supra section III.B
of this Article, a large amount deal with non-Hawaiian issues-thereby
showing the larger implications of the opinion.2 28 As analyzed below, the
Rice decision with its underlying historical flaws is being used as a tool to
oppress other colonized peoples struggling for justice.
In Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commission,229 for example, the
Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon Rice to justify its conclusion that the
voting restrictions for constitutional amendments in the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands ("Commonwealth" or "CNMI") was
unconstitutional.230 In so doing, the court dismantled a key component of
the Covenant between the Commonwealth and the United States.231 Indeed,
a "key aspect of the Covenant negotiations involved land use and
ownership."232 Section 805 of the Covenant specifically mandated that the
CNMI government regulate and restrict land ownership to persons of
Northern Marianas descent ("NMD") for twenty-five years after
termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and then "may" choose to
continue the restrictions after the twenty-five year period.233 An individual
of NMD was defined in Article XII, section 4 of the CNMI Constitution as:
227 See, e.g., Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
228 See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (citing Rice v. Cayetano,
528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)) ("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry
are by their nature odious to a free people."); Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2629
(2013) (citing Rice, 528 U.S. at 512) ("Consistent with the design of the Constitution, the
[Fifteenth] Amendment is cast in fundamental terms, terms transcending the particular
controversy which was the immediate impetus for its enactment.").
229 844 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Davis 1l].
230 See id. at 1091-95.
231 See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America, N. Mar. I.-U.S., Feb. 15, 1975, 90 Stat.
263 (1976) [hereinafter Covenant to Establish the CNMI]. Prior to the Covenant, CNMI was
part of a Trusteeship Agreement, in which the United States administered various islands in
the Pacific for the purpose of, among other things, promoting independence and self-
government among those people. See Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, No. 1-14-
CV-00002, 2014 WL 2111065, at *1 (N. Mar. I. May 20, 2014) [hereinafter Davis 1].
232 Nicole Manglona Torres, Comment, Self-Determination Challenges to Voter
Classifications in the Marianas After Rice v. Cayetano: A Call for a Congressional
Declaration of Territorial Principles, 14 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 152, 162 (2012); see also
Jose P. Mafnlas, Jr., Applying the Insular Cases to the Case of Davis v. Commonwealth
Election Commission: The Power of the Covenant and the Alternative Result, 22 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 105 (2016).
233 Covenant to Establish the CNMI, supra note 231, art. VIII, § 805.
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[A] person who is a citizen or national of the United States and who is of at
least one-quarter Northern Marianas Chamorro or Northern Marianas
Carolinian blood or a combination thereof or an adopted child of a person of
Northern Marianas descent if adopted while under the age of eighteen years.
For purposes of determining Northern Marianas descent, a person shall be
considered to be a full-blooded Northern Marianas Chamorro or Northern
Marianas Carolinian if that person was born or domiciled in the Northern
Mariana Islands by 1950 and was a citizen of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands before the termination of the Trusteeship with respect to the
Commonwealth.234
It is critical to note that the Northern Marianas Chamorro descend
primarily from late nineteenth and early twentieth century immigrants from
Guam, who "constituted a racially diverse group deriving from centuries of
intermarriage, on Guam ... composed of Spanish, Chamorro, Kanaken,
Tagalogs, Chinese, Japanese, German and other blood[.]" 2 35
To regulate the land alienation provision of Section 805, which the Ninth
Circuit upheld,236 a constitutional provision required that one must be of
NMD in order to vote to amend Article XII. 23 7 Accordingly, the "NMD
classification is specifically intended for the political question of whether
persons of NMD want to continue land alienation restrictions in the
CNMI."23 8 In order to effectuate Section 805 of the Covenant, the CNMI
government passed legislation that created the Northern Marianas Descent
234 N. MAR. 1. CONST. article XII, § 4.
235 Brief Amicus Curiae of Northern Marianas Descent Corporation in Support of
Defendants-Appellants and Reversal at 11, 844 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-16090),
2014 WL 5510536, at *11 (citing HERMANN H.L.W. COSTENOBLE, THE MARIANAs 46-47
(1905)).
236 See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1992). In Wabol, the court
stated the following regarding the Covenant:
Its bold purpose was to protect minority rights, not to enforce homogeneity. Where
land is so scarce, so precious, and so vulnerable to economic predation, it is
understandable that the islanders' vision does not precisely coincide with mainland
attitudes toward property and our commitment to the ideal of equal opportunity in its
acquisition. We cannot say that this particular aspect of equality is fundamental in the
international sense. It therefore does not apply ex proprio vigore to the
Commonwealth. Accordingly, Congress acted within its power in enacting sections
501(b) and 805 of the Covenant, and Article XII is not subject to equal protection
attack.
Id.
237 N. MAR. 1. CONST. art. XVIII(5)(c) ("In the case of a proposed amendment to Article
XII of this Constitution, the word 'voters' as used in subsection 5(a) above shall be limited
to eligible voters under Article VII who are also persons of Northern Marianas descent as
described in Article XII, Section 4, and the term 'votes cast' as used in subsection 5(b) shall
mean the votes cast by such voters.").
238 Torres, supra note 232, at 157.
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Registry within the Commonwealth Election Commission.239 That law
required that a Northern Marianas Descent Identification verification "that
will be issued only to persons who are qualified pursuant to Art. XII,
[section] 4" be produced to register for an election that requires only
persons of NMD to vote, pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 5.240
John H. Davis, Jr., an American citizen and registered CNMI voter,
maintained that the NMD classification in Article XVIII of the CNMI
Constitution and Public Law 17-40 violated, among other provisions, the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
and requested an injunction to allow him to vote in a 2014 special election
to consider changes to the definition of NMD. 24 1 Relying upon Rice, the
United States District Court for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands
concluded that the Article XVIII used ancestry as a proxy for race, which
ran afoul of the Fifteenth Amendment.2 42
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision and affirmed the
judgment: "The restriction is invalid and may not be enforced. Our analysis
is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in [Rice]."2 4 3 The court
specifically held: "Just as the definitions of Hawaiian and native Hawaiian
in the Rice statute referred to specific ethnic or aboriginal groups, the
definition of NMD in Article XII, section 4, ties voter eligibility to descent
from an ethnic group." 244
The court then concluded that Davis "cannot be distinguished from
Rice." 24 5 First, it held that Rice was about ancestry, which according to the
246Court was a "proxy" for race, and so too was Davis2. Despite the court
acknowledging that "some persons who were not of Chamorro or
Carolinian ancestry lived on the islands in 1950,",247 thereby precluding the
notion that the NMD definition was based on race, the Ninth Circuit pitted
the classification with Rice, where the Court rejected the argument that the
classification based upon the 1778 date of western contact in Hawai'i was
race-neutral.248
239 See Act of March 31, 2010, 2011 N. Mar. I. Pub. L. 40.
240 Id. §§ 2(c)(1)-(4).
241 Davis 1, 2014 WL 2111065, at *1.
242 Id. at **11-18 (citing Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514-15 (2000)).
243 Davis II, 2016 WL 7438633, at *3.
244 Id. at *4 (citing Rice, 528 U.S. at 509-10; Davis I, 2014 WL 2111065, at *15).
245 Id. at *5.
246 id.
247 id.
248 Id. at *5 (citing Rice, 528 U.S. at 516).
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Second, and ignoring the clear mandate of Section 805 of the Covenant,
the court brazenly stated that persons of NMD are not "quasi-sovereign or
otherwise distinct from the Commonwealth citizenry as a whole ... [.]",249
In much the same way that the Court used "glittering generalities" in Rice
to conclude that Native Hawaiians did not have a political status,250 the
Ninth Circuit tried to fit the CNMI's own unique history into the box of
Rice.2 51
Third, the Davis court held that the voting classification "would divide
the citizenry of the Commonwealth between NMDs and non-NMDs when
voting on amendments to a property restriction that affects everyone."252
Again, the court used Rice to foreclose the argument that those of NMD
have a "specialized interest" in Article XII's alienation restrictions: "That
position ... rests, in the end, on the demeaning premise that citizens of a
particular race are somehow more qualified than others to vote on certain
matters."253 Akin to Rice, the Ninth Circuit failed to acknowledge that
those of NMD should be the only individuals to vote on amendments to the
definition of NMD, particularly given the validity of the alienation
restrictions.254
Clearly, Rice was the standard by which the federal court needed to fit
the Commonwealth's efforts to preserve their land for their people.
However, it was as if the Ninth Circuit was comparing apples and oranges.
Rice, for example, was decided within the context of a State law that
governed a State entity, whereas, Davis dealt with an independent sovereign
government with a wholly separate and distinct Covenant relationship. In
the end, the Ninth Circuit used Rice as precedent to dismantle a key
component of the CNMI's effort to control the alienation of their limited
land.255 Davis, thus, directly demonstrates the harm of Rice and its use as a
tool to oppress marginalized communities.
249 Id. at *5 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
250 Rice, 528 U.S. at 527-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251 See supra text accompanying note 235 (discussing the uniqueness of the CNMI
people).
252 Davis II, 2016 WL 7438633, at *6.
253 Id. (citing Rice, 528 U.S. at 523).
254 See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1992).
255 Even assuming arguendo that one adopts Rice as precedent, it should only be binding
in Hawai'i as that case dealt specifically with the State of Hawai'i's relationship with the
indigenous community.
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2. Mandating Fear
Another consequence of the Court's slanted narrative of Hawaiian history
and its decision is the sense of fear that it instilled.256 The Hawaiian
sovereignty discussion prior to and after Rice provides an apt illustration of
the consequences of the decision.
Prior to the decision in Rice, there appeared to be building momentum
257toward some form of an independent governing nation of Hawaiians.
The State of Hawai'i passed various laws to study the issue of Hawaiian
sovereignty,258 and in 1993 co-sponsored a centennial observation of the
overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i. 25 9
256 In a similar light, some have argued that the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 344 U.S. 1 (1952), actually slowed the progress that was being made in the South
on civil rights, particularly stymying the strides in integration that was taking shape in the
South. See KLARMAN, supra note 108, at 389 (arguing that "before Brown focused attention
on school desegregation, southern politics was generally controlled by moderates, who
downplayed race while accommodating gradual racial change. Brown turned that political
world upside down"). Political rhetoric immediately shifted after Brown. For example,
Georgia Governor-elect Marvin Griffin announced, "come hell or high water, races will not
be mixed in Georgia schools." Id. at 390. Mississippi Senator James Eastland stated that the
South "will not abide or obey this legislative decision by a political court indoctrinated and
brainwashed by Left-wing pressure groups." LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 38 (2000). Klarman concluded that Brown radicalized southern
politics: first, because it was harder to ignore than earlier changes; second, it represented
federal interference in southern race relations; and third and most important, it commanded
that racial change take place in a different order than might otherwise have occurred. See
KLARMAN, supra note 108, at 391. Finkelman, however, challenged Klarman's critique and
noted that the desegregation of public elementary schools had nothing to do with the
ultimate violence that occurred at the University of Mississippi, the mob violence against the
freedom riders, or even the terrorist bombing of the home of Martin Luther King, Jr. See
Finkelman, supra note 108, at 1010-12. These events, Finkelman argued, are not direct
results of the Brown decision, but are in fact specific responses to other specific events. See
id.; see also POWE, supra, at 37 (citing urban Southern press coverage of the decision in two
leading newspapers and arguing that in general, the Southern response to Brown was
"surprisingly mild" and suggesting that ending segregations "was not the end of the world
and, more important, not a call for violence").
257 In the late-1980s, Ka Lahui Hawai'i was established by and for native Hawaiians,
without the interference of State or Federal agencies, to effectuate a multi-step approach
toward achieving sovereignty. See KA LAHUI HAWAI'I, MASTER PLAN 1-11 (1995).
258 See, e.g., Act Relating to the Island of Kaho'olawe, §2, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 806.
259 Act Relating to Hawaiian Sovereignty, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 999-1000.
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Following Rice, however, there was a clear push for federal
recognition.2 60 United States Senator Daniel K. Akaka and the rest of
Hawai'i's congressional delegation formed a Task Force on Native
Hawaiian issues because the Rice decision had created a "sense of urgency"
for Hawaiians. 26 ' The Task Force's immediate goal was to clarify the
relationship between Hawaiians and the federal government. 26 2 The Task
Force's solution was federal legislation-an idea that the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs trustees vigorously latched onto in an attempt to save
h * 263their agency.
On July 20, 2000, following the work of his Task Force, Senator Akaka
introduced "A Bill to Express the Policy of the United State Regarding the
United States' Relationship with Native Hawaiians, and for Other
Purposes[,]" which proposed to recognize Hawaiians as indigenous people
264that have a right to self-determination under federal Indian law.
Specifically in response to Rice, Senator Akaka's bill, later referred to as
the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act or the Akaka Bill,
sought to clarify the political status of Native Hawaiians with the federal
govermment, establish a process to create a Hawaiian governing entity that
would be federally recognized, and protect various Hawaiian-serving
programs from constitutional challenges. 265 Federal recognition, for some,
meant the conveyance of a special status to a Native Hawaiian government
that could come with a broad array of federal protections and benefits.266
Federal recognition implies a level of self-determination for Native
Hawaiians. The Akaka Bill, which has gone through various iterations and
has been introduced in every Congress for well over a decade, represented
an admirable effort by Hawai'i's congressional delegation to facilitate and
codify in American law self-governance and self-determination for
260 The fears were not unfounded as lawsuits streamed in challenging the political status
of Native Hawaiians. See Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2007) (challenging
various State of Hawaii programs that provide preferential treatment to Native Hawaiians);
Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003) (alleging that various provisions of the
Hawai'i Constitution violated the equal protection clause); Arakaki v. Hawai'i, 314 F.3d
1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (challenging the requirement that Office of Hawaiian Affairs trustees
be Native Hawaiian).
261 Melody K. MacKenzie, Native Hawaiians and U.S. Law, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW:
A TREATISE 264, 312 (MacKenzie et al. eds., 2015).
262 J. Kehaulani Kauanui, The Politics of Blood and Sovereignty in Rice v. Cayetano, 25
POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 110, 120 (2002).
263 See A Bill to Express the Policy of the United State Regarding the United States'
Relationship with Native Hawaiians, S. 2899, 106th Cong. (2000).
264 id.
265 See MacKenzie, supra note 261, at 312-16.
266 COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.02[3] (Nell Jessup Newton et al.
eds., 2005).
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Hawai'i's indigenous people. Through the Akaka Bill, as then-Office of
Hawaiian Affairs Chairperson Haunani Apoliona expressed:
the Native Hawaiian people seek the restoration of their government, because
they know and have witnessed how the Federal policy of self-determination
and self-governance has not only had a dramatic impact on the ability of
Native communities to take their rightful place in the American family of
governments, but also how that policy has enabled Native people to grow and
thrive.267
For over a decade, from 2000 through 2012, the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs championed federal legislation to grant Hawaiians self-
determination to enable the establishment of a government-to-government
relationship between the federal government and Native Hawaiians.268 The
costly effort mired the agency in conflict with nationalist Hawaiians, who
believed that recourse should be obtained on the international stage, and
pro-American conservatives, who believed that the entity was wasting
funds to benefit a portion of the State's citizenry. With its decision in Rice,
the Court changed the trajectory of the movement for sovereignty in forcing
the hands of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to scramble for recognition.
IV. (RE)RIGHTING HISTORY
If advocates are going to deal with precedent that contains history (and
they have a lot of it to deal with), or urge a court to adopt their positions
based on historical arguments, they had better understand the principles of
historical scholarship. If legal scholars are going to analyze cases that
include history, they had better know something of the history that they
269
propose to explain.
While there is considerable harm from the Court's writing of Hawaiian
history, that harm is exponentially increased when the opinions are used to
then buttress a scholarly retelling of history. Legal practitioners and
scholars, particularly those in Hawai'i, must carefully disaggregate the
Court's "truth" with the current historical scholarship.
267 Hearing on S. 1011 Before the S. Committee on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 13 (2009)
(statement of S. Haunani Apoliona, Office of Hawaiian Affairs).
268 See MacKenzie, supra note 261, at 312-16.
269 Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and
Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REv. 377, 384 (1998).
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In a recently published article,270 James S. Bums,27 retired and respected
Chief Judge of the Hawai'i Intermediate Court of Appeals, takes on
constitutional scholar Jon Van Dyke's conclusion that the Crown Lands
belong in trust to the Native Hawaiian people.272 As other authors have
alluded, and which will not be elaborated on here, there are errors with the
article's recitation of history and conclusion. 273 Relevant here, however, is
the article's reliance on both the Rice and Office of Hawaiian Affairs
decisions for various historical points.274 Relying upon the Court's slanted
recitation of Hawai'i's past, as described above, does considerable harm
because it legitimizes what the Court stated,2 75 and effectively silences a
people pursing justice.
270 James S. Bums, The Crown Lands Trust: Who Were, Who Are, the Beneficiaries?, 38
U. LAw. L. REv. 213, 251, 259 (2016).
271 Judge Burns passed away on March 9, 2017. Press Release, Hawai'i State Judiciary,
Joint Statements on the Passing of Chief Judge James S. Burns (Mar. 9, 2017),
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/news and reports/featurednews/2017/03/j oint-statements-on-
the-passing-of-chief-judge-james-s-burns. The author met with Judge Burns prior to his
passing to discuss the contents of Burns' article and the author's perspective. Judge Burns
was gracious and encouraged further dialogue about the subject matter.
272 Professor Van Dyke passed away on November 29, 2011. Press Release, University
of Hawai'i William S. Richardson School of Law, Obituary: John Markham Van Dyke
(Dec. 9, 2011), https://www.law.hawaii.edu/news/2011/12/09-0. Professor Van Dyke was a
well-respected scholar and intellectual, who committed a large part of his life's work to
understanding and educating about the legal and political struggles of Native Hawaiians.
See id. As noted above, Professor Van Dyke served as counsel to the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs in the Rice case. See supra note 216.
273 See Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie & D. Kapua'ala Sproat, Conflicting Histories:
Reclaiming Hawai'i's Crown Lands Trust in Response to James S. Burns, 39 U. HLw. L.
REv. 481, 482-87 (2017) (discussing collective memory); Avis Kuuipoleialoha Poai, Tales
From the Dark Side of the Archives: Making History in Hawai'i Without Hawaiians, 39 U.
LAw. L. REv. 537, 554-65 (2017) (discussing the reliance on dubious sources); see Osorio
& Beamer supra note 139, at 469 (discussing errors regarding the Mahele and the agency of
the sovereigns).
274 See Burns, supra note 270, at 251, 259.
275 Scholars and practitioners of the laws of the State of Hawai'i have a particular
responsibility to ensure that Hawai'i's history does not succumb to the American narrative
of the past. As shown in Section IIB, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has done a commendable
job at recognizing the unique history of Hawai'i. See Yamamoto & Ayabe, supra note 190,
at 517.
674
2017 / (RE)RIGHTING HISTORY
A. Silencing Marginalized Voices
When regurgitating the Court's warped narrative of Hawaiian history
without correcting the errors or clarifying the shortcomings, judges and
practitioners silence the people trying to right historical wrongs that have
plagued them for well over a century. Bums' article provides an apt
example. There, the article cites to Rice for its discussion regarding the
Section 5(f) funds and the federal set aside of 200,000 acres under the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act for "native Hawaiians[.]" 2 76 Although
one would expect such a discussion in a piece discussing Hawaiian land
issues, there is no recognition in the essay of the considerable harm of the
Act and the issue of blood quantum in dividing families and the Hawaiian
people from the land.277
In 1921, with years of returning lands to Native Americans as precedent
and with a strong Native Hawaiian presence in Delegate (Prince) Jonah
Kalaniana'ole KTihi6 and Territorial Senator John H. Wise as
representatives advocating for rights of the indigenous people, the United
States Congress reluctantly decided to gift lands back to native Hawaiians,
those individuals of "any descendent of not less than one-half part of the
blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778.",278
Congress defined these people by the then-conventional method of blood
quantum.279 Hearings were held about the conditions of Hawai'i's
indigenous peoples and the United States Congress learned that Hawaiians
were a "dying race" with the number of "full-blooded Hawaiians" dropping
from 142,500 in 1826 to 22,500 in 19 19.280 Territorial Senator Wise noted:
The Hawaiian people are a farming people and fishermen, out-of-door people,
and when they were frozen out of their lands and driven into the cities they
had to live in the cheapest places, tenements. That is one of the reasons why
the Hawaiian people are dying. Now, the only way to save them, I contend, is
276 See Bums, supra note 270, at 259.
277 There is no question that blood quantum has been an issue that has haunted Hawaiians
and other indigenous communities throughout the United States. Indeed, Native Hawaiians
have criticized the Act: "The blood quantum issue is intentionally divisive," decried
Adelaide "Frenchy" DeSoto. Ron Stanton, Hawaii's Own: A Look at a Century of
Annexation, HAw. TRIB. HERALD, Aug. 10, 1998, at 1. "It was a devious plot, but it has
survived for decades." Id.
278 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 67-34, § 201(a)(7), 42 Stat. 108, 108
(1921).
279 See id.
280 See H.R. REP. No. 66-839, at 2 (1920).
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to take them back to the lands and give them the mode of living that their
ancestors were accustomed to and in that way rehabilitate them.281
Following the failed attempt to pass the "Rehabilitation Bill" the first
time, Prince Jonah Kalaniana'ole KFlhi6 framed the failure on procedural
grounds.282 KFlhi6 did little to mention the substantive objections to the bill
that echoed through the chambers of the United States Capitol.283
Nevertheless, Congress subsequently enacted the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act,28 4 and KFlhi6 and Wise's goal of putting Hawaiians back
on the land was achieved. The harsh result of the Act, however, is a system
in which the diminution of individuals of "not less the one-half' blood
through interracial procreation ultimately leads to a lack of beneficiaries
and the subsequent returning of lands to the government,285 further
separating Hawaiians from their lands. Put another way, this Act was
established with the intention of rehabilitation, but the reality is that
eventually there will be no more native Hawaiians to rehabilitate. As
American Studies Professor J. Kahaulani Kauanui asserted, the Act and the
issue of "[b]lood quantum is a manifestation of settler colonialism that
works to deracinate-to pull out by the roots-and displace indigenous
peoples."286
281 Id. at 4.
282 Prince Jonah Kalaniana'ole Kuthio reported:
Though the Bill itself died with the passing of the last Congress on March 4, I am able
to state to you that many of its provisions met no opposition and that the much
discussed sections opening the way for the Hawaiians to return to the land were looked
upon favorably by the members of both Houses of Congress.... Yes, the Bill is dead;
but it failed at the last movement in the Senate owing to the congestions of business at
the short session of Congress."
J. KEHAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD: COLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF
SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY 150 (2008)
283 The notion of rehabilitating Hawaiians resonated with some federal legislators. Id. at
109-13. Others, questioning the constitutionality of a race-based legislation, found comfort
in analogizing native Hawaiians with Native Americans of the continent. Id. at 113-16. For
example, United States Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane analogized native
Hawaiians to Native Americans when he articulated, "the natives of the [Hawaiian]
islands ... are our wards ... and for whom in a sense we are trustees." H.R. Rep. No. 66-
839, at 4 (1920).
284 Pub. L. No. 67-34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921).
285 See id. § 201(a)(7), 42 Stat. 108.
286 KAUANUI, supra note 282, at 9.
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The Act is inherently flawed because it is "rooted in racism and shot
through with paternalism." 28 7  During the debates that surrounded
enactment of the Act, various issues of inherent racism and paternalism
were raised. First, in order to achieve passage of the bill, the proposed Act
was portrayed as an Anti-Asian law that would prevent individuals of Asian
decent from acquiring lands in the U.S. and prevent them from being more
successful than indigenous Hawaiians.2 88  Second, the Act, originally
intended for indigenous Hawaiians of 1/32 part Hawaiian blood,289 was
amended to be one-half part.290 On this issue of part Hawaiians, A.G.M.
Robertson pronounced that:
the part-Hawaiian[s] . .. are a virile, prolific, and enterprising lot of people.
They have large families and they raise them - they bring them up. These part
Hawaiians have had the advantage, since annexation especially, of the
American viewpoint and the advantage of a pretty good public school system,
and they are an educated people. They are not in the same class with the pure
bloods.2 9 '
Paternalism is reflected in the Act because native Hawaiians become
wards of the government by having to pay rent for the lands, instead of
being given lands fee simple.292 The Dawes Act did the same for Native
Americans; it reflected the federal government's efforts at the time to deal
with the indigenous communities of the United States.293
The racist and paternalistic issue of blood quantum would again resurface
in Rice. In a concurring opinion in Rice, Justices Stephen Breyer and David
Souter joined the result of the majority's decisions, but specifically
concluded that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' electorate did not
sufficiently resemble an Indian tribe.294 The usually consistent liberal
287 Lesley Karen Friedman, Native Hawaiians, Self-Determination, and the Inadequacy
of the State Land Trusts, 14 U. HAw. L. REv. 519, 562 (1992).
288 KAUANUI, supra note 282, at 107-08 (noting that Congressional leaders and Judges
had unfavorable and racist views of Asians).
289 Id. at 152-53 (noting the proposal for a blood quantum of one-thirty-second degree
Hawaiian blood).
290 See Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 67-34, § 201(a)(7), 42 Stat. 108,
108 (1921).
291 KAUANUI, supra note 282, at 127.
292 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 67-34, § 207(b), 42 Stat. 108, 111
(1921) ("The title to lands so leased shall remain in the State.").
293 The Act's blood quantum requirement is considered "more stringent than the
membership requirements imposed by most mainland tribes." Friedman, supra note 287, at
565.
294 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 525 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). For Justice
Breyer, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs was nothing more than "a special purpose department
of Hawaii's state government." Id. at 526.
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voices addressed blood quantum and how the State's definition of
"Hawaiian" was so "broad" that it went "well beyond any reasonable limit"
because it included all individuals of Hawaiian ancestry without regard to
blood quantum. 295  For Justices Breyer and Souter, a line needed to be
drawn to determine who qualified for benefits and those that did not-and
that line would be based upon percentage of blood.296 During oral
arguments in Rice, Justices Kennedy and Scalia pressed the federal
government about the acceptability of someone with 148th, 196th, "195th
Hawaiian blood" to participate in the Office of Hawaiian Affairs'
elections.297
Justice Breyer also suggested the arbitrariness of ancestry: "It seems to
me ... that everyone who has one Hawaiian ancestor at least gets to vote,
and more than half of those people are not native Hawaiians. They just
have a distant ancestor."298 Justice Breyer then asked "How do we extend
that to people [ten] generations later, who had [ten] generations ago one
Indian ancestor? I mean that might apply to everybody in the room. We
have no idea." 299 In much the same way that opponents of the one thirty-
second blood quantum quota argued that such dilution of blood made a
Hawaiian individual "to all intents and purposes a white person[,]" 3 00
Justice Breyer's line of questioning and decision implied that dilution of
blood quantum disqualified individuals from being members of a sovereign
indigenous body. The Court, with both conservative and liberal support,
thus, reaffirmed the early twentieth century doctrine and again tied
indigeneity, and thus sovereignty, to blood quantum, which has enabled
"white American economic, political, and social domination" to endure.30 '
295 Id. at 526-27.
296 The Court, thus, "relied on the logics of dilution to undermine inclusive
conceptualizations of Nativeness." Kauanui, supra note 262, at 118.
297 Rice Oral Argument, supra note 45, at *40.
298 Id. at *29. (emphasis added).
299 Id. at *35; See Rice, 528 U.S. at 501 (Breyer, J., concurring). In his concurring
opinion, Justice Breyer declared the connection to one Native ancestor as meaningless:
There must . . .be . . . some limit on what is reasonable, at the least when a State
(which is not itself a tribe) creates the definition. And to define that membership in
terms of 1 possible ancestor out of 500, thereby creating a vast and unknowable body
of potential members-leaving some combination of luck and interest to determine
which potential members become actual voters-goes well beyond any reasonable
limit.
Rice, 528 U.S. at 501 (Breyer, J., concurring).
300 Kauanui, supra note 262, at 118 (citation omitted).
301 KAUANUI, supra note 282, at 183.
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Missing from Justice Breyer's recitation of blood logic (as well as Judge
Bums' use of Rice and the HHCA) was a recognition of the ways in which
Hawaiians themselves viewed the issue of blood quantum.3 02  For
Hawaiians, the connection to a people is not based upon blood quantum, but
rather a deep connection to the land.303 But, clearly, missing from Justice
Breyer's concurrence (and Judge Bums' piece) is the true goal of the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act: displace Hawaiians from the land.
The willingness to simply accept the mandates of the Act without
criticizing or even simply acknowledging the divisiveness of the issue and
its validity is unacceptable and silences the indigenous perspective of these
racist laws. This type of omission does a disservice to the advancement of
justice for all. Judges and practitioners must keep a sensitivity to the stories
of marginalized communities and must be vigilant in ensuring that the little
they have is protected.
302 The issue of blood quantum has also divided the Hawaiian community and pitted
those with one-half part Hawaiian blood against all others. See Day v. Apoliona, 616 F.3d
918 (9th Cir. 2010); Kealoha v. Machado, 131 Hawai'i 62, 315 P.3d 213 (2013). While
American blood logic emerged in Rice through Justice Breyer's concurrence, so too did the
argument of native Hawaiians who challenged the agency's expenditure of section 5(f) trust
funds for both native Hawaiians and Hawaiians. In an amicus brief to the Court, the Hou
Hawaiians (a self-described tribal body of native Hawaiians, as defined by the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act) criticized the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' expenditures and
compared Hawaiians to dogs:
Suppose wolves were an endangered species and Congress had given the state of
Virginia 1.4 million acres of land in trust to provide habitat and funding to preserve
them. If Virginia installed the American Kennel Club as trustees of this land and they,
in turn, proposed that the definition of wolf be changed to include all breeds of
domestic dogs, it would be a clear breach of trust. OHA is doing the same thing.
OHA wants a person who is one-half Filipino, one-quarter Japanese, one-eighth
Caucasian, one-sixteenth Chinese and one-sixteenth Hawaiian to be given the same
benefits as a person who is one-half Hawaiian. How can such a person make a claim
to participate as an equal beneficiary with a person who is one-half Hawaiian?
Brief of Amici Curiae, The Hou Hawaiians and Maui Loa, Native Hawaiian Beneficiaries at
10, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818), 1999 WL 374578, at *10. The
Hou Hawaiians' analogy conjures images of a pack of ravaging dogs fighting over scraps.
The Hou Hawaiians were unfortunately ingratiated with the American blood logic and the
notion that they were more worthy of resources than those of less than fifty percent
Hawaiian blood.
303 See Friedman, supra note 287, at 564-65. Friedman states:
People in Hawaii were predominantly identified by their relationship to the country or
to the society or to the 'aina [land]. Thus people were called by the terms Kama'aina
(adopted to the land); Hoa'aina (friend of the land); Kua'aina (backbone of the land);
or Maka'ainana (eyes of the land). The person who had no such relationship was a
Malihini (stranger, newcomer).
Id. (citation omitted).
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B. Vigilance for the Future
It is not reasonable to bifurcate history from the law. Indeed, as Judge
Richard A. Posner stated, "Law is the most historically oriented, or if you
like the most backward-looking, the most 'past dependent,' of the
professions."3 04 With no other choice but to use history, a compromise
must be made to ensure that the history that is used is accurate. As this
Article has shown, Hawaiian history is unique and highly complicated.
How is it then that practitioners and judges ensure that their recounting of
Hawai'i's unique history is adequate? Are there structural changes that can
be made to the legal system to ensure that attorneys and jurists are educated
and sensitive to Native Hawaiian issues? How do scholars and lawyers stay
vigilant given the uncertain times ahead?305
To ensure accuracy of the recitation of Hawaiian history, practitioners
and judges should adhere to these guiding principles: first, acknowledge the
tremendous wrongs committed against the Native Hawaiian people;3 06
second, be open to using non-legal resources;307 third, consistently update
the historical narrative based upon the scholarship available to ensure that
the narrative accounts for the stories of all people;308 and fourth, use both
304 Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 573 (2000); see also Kelly,
supra note 13, at 157. Kelly notes:
[T]he essential nature of the judicial process, as already observed, is too close to that
of history-writing for the Court [to] ever abandon entirely either the use of history or
the writing of history. But a historian might observe that the historical evidence seems
to indicate the Court's history to be [the] most dubious in those instances in which an
appeal to the past has been recruited for activist purposes of interventionist political
implications. It is on those occasions that the worst kind of law-office history makes
its appearance in the Court's opinions.
Kelly, supra note 13 at 157.
305 Indeed, with the election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States, there
is a legitimate concern for the future of Native Hawaiian programs. See Troy J.H. Andrade,
Legacy in Paradise: Analyzing the Obama Administration's Efforts of Reconciliation with
Native Hawaiians, 22 MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2017).
306 Legal scholars, jurists, and attorneys have a moral obligation to, at the very least,
acknowledge the harms that have come from colonization. See HAw. R. SUP. CT. 1.5(c) ("I
will faithfully discharge my duties as attorney, counselor, and solicitor in the courts of the
state to the best of my ability, giving due consideration to the legal needs of those without
access to justice." (emphasis added)).
307 See Melton, supra note 269, at 435 ("The number of possible sources for historical
study, consequently, is staggering; the number of finding aids alone is daunting.").
308 See Joshua Stein, Historians Before the Bench: Friends of the Court, Foes of
Originalism, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 359, 387 (2013) ("[C]ourts who use historical
knowledge [or] arguments ought to use history accurately and responsibly, avoiding if
possible the 'lawyer's history' . . . . Our job is to provide the Court with the best historical
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primary and secondary sources, so long as the biases of these sources are
analyzed.3 09
The last point is particularly important given the vast variety of resources
available on Hawaiian history. For example, the Rice majority relied
heavily upon the biased writings of non-native historian Ralph S.
Kuykendall.3 10 Kuykendall authored a multi-volume book of Hawaiian
history.31 ' Kuykendall wrote these texts at the request of the Historical
Commission of the Territory of Hawai'i,3 12 and, by virtue of his
methodological approach, writes as if he was the sole authority on the topic.
Kuykendall was tasked to write these works as textbooks that would paint
the territorial government in a favorable light and the monarchy in a
negative light.313 One of the methodological choices made by Kuykendall
was to use little, if any, native sources of information; he also chose not to
use any non-English sources.314 Unsurprisingly, Kuykendall presents a
biased view of history and often portrays the dramatic transformation in
Hawaiian legal, political, and economic landscape as gradual and welcomed
by the Hawaiians. At some points, he improperly rationalized actions of
natives. Kuykendall, as an example, writes that the monarchy's resistance
to takeover by the United States was, among other things, anti-haole
racism,3 15 as opposed to simple resistance against a takeover of their
knowledge available[.]" (citation omitted)); see also Robinson v. City of Detroit, 462 Mich.
439, 464, 613 N.W.2d 307, 320 (Mich. 2000) ("We must also recognize that stare decisis is a
'principle of policy' rather than 'an inexorable command,' and that the Court is not
constrained to follow precedent when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly
reasoned." (citations omitted)). For example, Hawaiian language resources have not been
fully mined to provide historians and scholars with a full picture of Hawaiian history. Poai,
supra note 273, at 575-82.
309 See Melton, supra note 269, at 435 ("Once the researcher has begun to locate
documents of interest, the next step is that of determining the accuracy of the document's
contents, and to understand how the information in those sources relates to other
information."); id. at 457 (noting that the trend in historical research is to rely on primary
sources, but finding that there is also value to using secondary sources).
310 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 500 (2000).
311 See R.S. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, 1778-1854: FOUNDATION AND
TRANSFORMATION (1938); R.S. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, 1854-1874:
TWENTY CRITICAL YEARS (1953); R.S. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, 1874-1893:
THE KALAKAUA DYNASTY (1967) [hereinafter THE KALAKAUA DYNASTY).
312 See Publisher's Note, in THE KALAKAUA DYNASTY, supra note 311, at v.
313 See MICHAEL K. DUDLEY & KEONI K. AGARD, A HAWAIIAN NATION II: A CALL FOR
HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY 110-11 (1990).
314 See Charles H. Hunter, Preface to THE KALAKAUA DYNASTY, supra note 311, at vii.
315 For example, Kuykendall writes:
In the succeeding period, we observe what was apparently a deliberate effort to
separate natives and foreigners and to foment race hatred. The cry was raised,
"Hawai[']i for the Hawaiians"; and this slogan was used to promote the political
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homeland. Yet, Kuykendall's books were widely read and cited, including
by the federal government. For instance, the Native Hawaiians Study
Commission,316 which was commissioned by Congress to assess the federal
government's responsibility and recommend further reparatory action, drew
significantly on Kuykendall's work in the early 1980's.317  A majority of
the Native Hawaiians Study Commission-all political appointees in the
Reagan Administration-determined that the federal government was not
responsible for the illegal overthrow of the monarchy and recommended
that Native Hawaiians did not need an apology or reparations.31
Kuykendall's methodological approach and ultimate product, while helpful
to synthesize the entire history of Hawai'i from 1778 to 1893, lends itself to
criticism.
Native scholars are not immune from similar criticism. Indeed,
renowned historian Samuel Manaiakalani Kamakau's life may have
influenced his view of Hawaiian history. Educated at the missionary high
school at Lahainaluna, Kamakau offers a unique and sometimes jaded
glimpse of life in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Throughout
Kamakau's Ruling Chiefs of Hawai 'i,3 19 one can see the major influence of
Western religion. Kamakau provides a sermon on sacrifice and the deeds
of past rulers to which future generations will be punished. 32 0 Additionally,
when a group of Hawaiian individuals were spared by the volcanoes fire,
they claimed their safety was ensured because of the taboo flags that they
carried in front and behind them. 32 1 Kamakau quickly rebuts the
individual's story and criticizes them: "They did not think of Jehovah and
give credit to him for their escape!" 3 22 When Kamakau recounts the final
acts of Kamehameha to solidify his rule of the island of Hawai'i,
specifically the sacrifice of his cousin Keoua Kiahu'ula, he again attributes
this unification to a foreign god: "They may not have known that it was the
power of Jehovah which united these small dominions into a single
interests of various persons. That a feeling of racial antagonism existed is clearly
apparent. That this feeling was intensified in the reign of Kalakaua is equally clear.
THE KALAKAUA DYNASTY, supra note 311, at 187
316 See Native Hawaiians Study Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 96-565, § 302, 94 Stat.
3321, 3324 (1980) (establishing the Native Hawaiians Study Commission).
317 See, e.g., NATIVE HAWAIIANS STUDY COMM'N, REPORT ON THE CULTURE, NEEDS AND
CONCERNS OF NATIVE HAWAIIANS 320-21 (1983).
318 Id. at 28 ("[T]he Commission concludes that, as an ethical or moral matter, Congress
should not provide for native Hawaiians to receive compensation either for loss of land or of
sovereignty.").
319 SAMUEL H. KAMAKAU, RULING CHIEFS OF HAWAI'I (1992).
320 Id. at 140-41.
321 Id. at 152.
322 id.
682
2017 / (RE)RIGHTING HISTORY
kingdom." 3 23 Thus, although Kamakau offers a Hawaiian perspective, parts
of his work are influenced by his teachings in the Western and Christian
discipline.
Aside from following the principles articulated above, there are also
structural changes that, if made, would likely impact the recitation of
Hawaiian history or at least instill competency in and sensitivities to Native
Hawaiian issues for all attorneys and judges in Hawai'i. 32 4 For judges, the
Hawai'i Supreme Court could require that all judges attend mandatory
325
sessions on Hawai'i's political and legal history. Much like the State
Judiciary's conference on implicit biases for judges,32 6 a training on
Hawai'i's unique history can be beneficial to ensuring accuracy in the
future. For practicing attorneys, the Hawai'i Supreme Court could require a
mandatory continuing legal education course on Hawai'i's history. 3 27 For
future attorneys, the Hawai'i Supreme Court, in conjunction with the
State's Board of Bar Examiners, should require knowledge of Hawaiian
legal issues on future bar examinations. 328  For all, Hawaiian language
323 Id. at 157-58.
324 As one scholar noted, "If judges are going to write history, they should strive to do a
competent job of it." Melton, supra note 269, at 384.
325 Relatedly, training on Native Hawaiian issues is currently provided to all State
Department leaders and members of various boards and commission that have a stake in
Hawaiian issues. See HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 10-41, 10-42 (2015) (requiring certain state
councils, boards and commission to attend a legal training course on Hawaiian customs and
rights).
326 HAw. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM'N, REPORT TO THE ABA RESOURCE CENTER FOR ACCESS
TO JUSTICE INITIATIVES 6-7 (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal aid indigentdefendants/1s_sclaid atj rept re grant_2_27_14.authchec
kdam.pdf (last accessed Jan. 6, 2017) (noting that Chief Justice Mark E. Recktenwald
approved an all-day training for all State judges to understand how implicit bias may
influence a judge's decisions, understand the different scenarios or trial stages that could
raise possible bias, and understand the different techniques that may help change
stereotypical perceptions).
327 The Rules of the Hawai'i Supreme Court provide:
Except as otherwise provided herein, every active member of the Bar shall complete at
least 3 credit hours of approved continuing legal education (CLE) during each annual
reporting period. "Continuing legal education," or "CLE," is any legal educational
activity or program that is designed to maintain or improve the professional
competency of lawyers or to expand an appreciation and understanding of the ethical
and professional responsibility of lawyers and is approved for credit by the Hawai'i
State Bar, including those listed in Rule 22(b) of these Rules.
See HAw. R. SUP. CT. 22(a).
328 The Hawai'i Supreme Court (Supreme Court) shall appoint a Board of Examiners
(Board) to administer the process of admission to the bar of the state. Nothing in this rule,
however, shall be construed to alter or limit the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court to
oversee and control the privilege of the practice of law in this state.").
See HAw. R. SUP. CT. 1.1. The idea of incorporating the indigenous rights law into the bar
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courses should be taken so that Hawaiian words are pronounced and spelled
correctly, and to better appreciate the richness of the Hawaiian culture.329
These structural changes would, again, instill a sensitivity to Native
Hawaiian issues and will stand as a firm commitment by the State's judicial
branch to truly reconciling with Native Hawaiians for the past injustices.
These simple actions could also go a long way in educating the federal
court judges and justices of the need for accuracy when addressing Native
Hawaiian issues.
V. CONCLUSION
History is complicated. Law is complicated. But, those complications
are no excuse for silencing the voice of a community that, by all accounts,
have been disadvantaged because of the colonizing efforts of the United
States. Attempting to justify legal disputes by resorting to false narratives
of Hawai'i's history is a dangerous practice that has repercussions to all
people. These "glittering generalities" are then enshrined and used
repeatedly thereafter to quash those seeking justice. These voices cannot
and will not be silenced. The legal community must no longer stand idle.
examination or admission process would not be a new concept as New Mexico and
Washington require knowledge of federal Indian law as part of their bar admission process.
See N.M.R.A. 15-107(A)(10) ("An applicant who meets the requirements of Rules 15-103
and 15-104 NMRA and this rule may, upon motion, be admitted to the practice of law in
New Mexico if the applicant ... submits evidence of in-person attendance at, and successful
completion of, a course approved by the Supreme Court, which shall include Indian law,
New Mexico community property law, and professionalism, before being approved for
admission."); WA. A.P.R. 5(b)(1) (noting that "[b]efore an applicant who has passed the bar
examination, or who qualifies for admission without passing the bar examination, may be
admitted, the applicant must ... take and pass the Washington Law Component[J" which
includes a section on Indian law). This author firmly believes that the bar examination
should not be used as a measure to admit candidates to the practice of law in a jurisdiction.
See Troy J.H. Andrade, Ke Kanawai Milmalahoe: Equality in Our Splintered Profession, 33
U. HAw. L. REv. 249 (2010).
329 The Hawaiian language is an official language of the State of Hawai'i. See HAw.
CONST. art. XV, § 4 ("English and Hawaiian shall be the official languages of Hawaii, except
that Hawaiian shall be required for public acts and transactions only as provided by law.");
Poai, supra note 217, at 582-98.
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